MINUTES

JOINT COMMITTEE ON KANSAS SECURITY

November 22, 2010
Room 548-S—Statehouse

Members Present

Senator Jay Scott Emler, Chairperson
Senator Anthony Hensley
Senator Thomas Owens
Representative Judith Loganbill
Representative Julie Menghini
Representative Lee Tafanelli

Members Absent

Representative Mario Goico, Vice-chairperson
Representative Dan Johnson
Senator Janis Lee
Senator Carolyn McGinn

Staff Present

Jill Shelley, Kansas Legislative Research Department
Corey Carnahan, Kansas Legislative Research Department
Aaron Klaassen, Kansas Legislative Research Department
Scott Wells, Office of the Revisor of Statutes
Ann McMorris, Committee Assistant

Conferees

Major General Tod Bunting, Adjutant General of Kansas
Jeremy Jackson, Coordinator, Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center, Office of the Attorney General
Jason Moses, Interoperable Communications Coordinator, Kansas Department of the Adjutant General
Dr. Robert Hull, Director, Kansas Center for Safe and Prepared Schools
JaLynn Copp, Office of the State Fire Marshal
Captain Marc J. McCune, Kansas Highway Patrol, Capitol Security
Stanley L. Rasmussen, Regional Counsel, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Colonel Terry Maple, Superintendent, Kansas Highway Patrol

Others Attending

See attached list.

Morning Session

Chairperson Emler opened the meeting at 10:05 a.m. and called on Adjutant General Tod Bunting.

Update and Overview of Homeland Security Programs and Initiatives

General Bunting presented slides covering homeland security funding, homeland security national trends, and National Preparedness Task Force recommendations (Attachment 1).

General Bunting introduced Jeremy Jackson, Coordinator, Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC), who described the KIFC's progress, analytical focus areas, and partnerships. He explained the partnerships' functions and types of information the partners make available.

General Bunting then explained local emergency operation plan status, the status of local mitigation plans in Kansas, and mitigation highlights, such as safe room projects and the purchase of flood-prone properties. Pictures of Crisis City and its various venues were displayed and described. A map of Kansas Homeland Security regions was displayed and regional accomplishments were noted. He also spoke on the accomplishments of the regional and state search and rescue task forces.

General Bunting introduced interoperable communications coordinator Jason Moses, who spoke on implementation of various initiatives regarding interoperable emergency communications and the statewide radio system. Mr. Moses also spoke on training initiatives to instruct first responders on emergency communications.

Dr. Robert Hull, Director, Kansas Center for Safe and Prepared Schools (KC-SPS), reviewed the KC-SPS mission, history, duties, early successes, problem statement, guiding principles, survey results, and needs for sustainability. He reported that approximately 250 of the state's 289 school districts are KC-SPS partners. Grants and other funding were discussed, and Dr. Hull answered questions about the role of the State Board of Education regarding safe and prepared schools.

Executive Session

It was moved by Representative Tafanelli, seconded by Senator Owens, that the open meeting of the Joint Committee on Kansas Security in Room 548-S of the Statehouse be recessed for a closed, executive meeting to commence immediately in Room 548-S of the Statehouse pursuant to Joint Rule 5 of the Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives and subsection (b)(13) of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 75-4319, as amended by section 14 of Chapter 132 of the 2009 Session Laws of Kansas, for the purpose of consulting with Adjutant General Tod Bunting regarding matters (1) relating to the security of public buildings or

facilities, or (2) matters relating to security measures which matters, if discussed at an open meeting, would jeopardize such security measures; that the Joint Committee on Kansas Security resume the open meeting in Room 548-S of the Statehouse at 11:30 a.m.; and that this motion, if adopted, be recorded in the minutes of the Joint Committee on Kansas Security and be maintained as a part of the permanent records of the Committee. Motion carried. The motion was adopted at 11:10 a.m. on November 22, 2010. Designated essential personnel were: Jeremy Jackson, Angee Morgan, Chuck Clanahan, Jerry Tenbrink, Bill Chornyak, Dr. Robert Hull, Terri Ploger-McCool, and Dan Hay (Attachment 2).

The open meeting resumed at 11:30 a.m.

Update on Kansas Bomb Squad Capabilities

Superintendent Terry L. Maple, Kansas Highway Patrol, provided information on the state bomb squad and the events that have transpired regarding this important state capability (Attachment 3).

JaLynn Copp, State Fire Marshal's office, speaking on behalf of State Fire Marshal Dan McLaughlin, provided an update on where their agency is in regard to the State Bomb Squad. She agreed to provide a memorandum on the information referred to in her report. Senator Owens requested a cost statement on the changes to the bomb squad (Attachment 4).

The Committee recessed for lunch at 12:00 noon.

Afternoon Session

Impact of Wind Power Development on Military Installations, Training, and Readiness

Stan Rasmussen, Regional Counsel, U.S. Army, spoke on the economic impact of the Department of Defense and wind power in Kansas; potential conflict issues, such as radar and airspace interference; Kansas-specific maps showing special use air spaces and current wind installations; existing processes and Department of Defense initiatives; and testimony from the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. He provided a research report by the Center for Economic Development and Business Research at Wichita State University titled "Fiscal and Economic Impact of Military Activity in Kansas." (This report is available through the website of the Kansas Governor's Military Council, http://governor.ks.gov/issues-a-initiatives/military-and-veterans/542-governors- military-council, as of November 2010.) He also provided copies of the following documents: a statement on the "Impact of Wind Farms on Military Readiness" made before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services by Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense; and a report on Renewable Energy and Economic Potential in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota produced by The Center for Rural Affairs; and (3) an article from *Scientific American* titled "Wind Turbine or Airplane? New Radar Could Cut Through the Signal Clutter" (Attachment 5).

Capitol Security Update

Captain Marc J. McCune, Troop K Commander, Kansas Highway Patrol, discussed matters relating to security measures regarding the Statehouse tunnel and access by lobbyists and others who enter the Capitol building daily. He described access card programming for these users. Chairperson Emler requested the Committee be advised of progress made on this program by the Capitol Police. A copy of a National Conference of State Legislatures Capitol Security Survey was distributed to the Committee (Attachment 6).

Committee Discussion and Recommendations

- Committee members voiced concern that the Kansas Highway Patrol and Kansas Fire Marshal were not able to work together on the bomb squad program. It has requested additional information.

- The Committee discussed roles of the KC-SPS and the Kansas Department of Education, and their responsibilities for safety in schools. It was noted that approximately 38 districts are not participating in the KC-SPS. Committee members asked what department and use of grant should encourage these non-participating districts to participate and local governments to encourage this approach. They also asked whether a portion of a $9.4 million grant received by the Department of Education for school safety could be used for KC-SPS activities. *It was moved by Representative Loganbill, seconded by Representative Tafanelli, that the Chairperson of the Joint Committee on Kansas Security request a place on the agenda of the next meeting of the State Board of Education to present Committee concerns regarding the school safety program. Motion carried.*

- The Committee noted that, while the Statehouse is under construction, it is difficult to consider entrance badges for people requiring daily access to the Capitol building. Committee members suggested that the cost of background checks could be covered by charging a fee to the recipient of an entrance badge.

- The Committee agreed to continue to monitor wind energy and other emerging technologies and their effects on radar and military operations in Kansas.

The meeting adjourned at 3:15 p.m.

Prepared by Ann McMorris
Edited by Jill Shelley

Approved by the Committee on:

December 28, 2010
(Date)

GUEST LIST

Joint Committee on Kansas Security
November 22, 2010

Name	Representing
Kevin Self	MNU
Lisa Self	MNU
Dave Sundgren	US Army
Ron Harris	
Stan Rasmussen	US Army
Wally Roberts	
Bill Chornyak	KS-HLS (adjutant General)
Dan Hay	" "
Bob Hull	Kansas Center for Safe Schools
Dave DePue	
JoLynn Lepp	State Fire Marshal's office
Terry Maple	KHP
Kimberly Straty	Wind Coalition
Tom Day	KLC
George Laliberte	KDOT Div. of Aviation

HOMELAND SECURITY OVERVIEW KANSAS ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT

November 22, 2010

Committee on Homeland Security



Budget Trends





Homeland Security National Trends

- Countering Violent Extremism
  - Eco-terrorist/animal rights extremists
    - Elf/Alf
  - Lone offenders
    - Abortion Clinic Assaults/Murders
  - Sovereign Citizen's movement
    - Militias, Skin Head groups
  - Anarchist Extremism
    - Anti-Capitalism, Anti-Globalism
      - Weather Underground Organization

Homeland Security National Trends

- Cyber Security
- Biological Preparedness and Response
- DHS Support to Fusion Centers
- Mass Transit, Passenger Rail and Aviation Security

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National Preparedness Task Force Recommendations

- Strategic Investment
- Policy and Guidance
- Capabilities and Assessments
- Grant Administration

Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center Progress

- Attorney General: Lead Agency
  - Director and Privacy Officers
- Adjutant General: Supporting Agency
  - Secure Facility accredited
  - Installing classified systems
- Multi-Agency: Sustainable Design
- State funded: Effective Design

Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center Progress

- Unparalleled access to classified threat information
- True multi-agency/multi-discipline fusion center
- Leading fusion center for private sector/critical infrastructure integration
- Focused on INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
  - Strategic and Tactical

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Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center

Analytical Focus Areas

- Terrorism, Asymmetric and International Criminal Enterprise Threats
- Health, Pandemic and Biological Threats
- Foreign Animal Disease and Agricultural Threats
- Power, Energy and Cyber Threats
  - Critical Infrastructure

Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center

KIFC Partnerships

- KS Attorney General
- KBI
- KHP
- KS DOC
- Topeka PD
- KCK PD
- FBI- KC Div.
- FBI/JTTF
- USA- KC Dist. ✓
- TSA- Wichita
- KS OJA
- Westar Energy ✓
- Wolf Creek
- KCPL
- Midwest Energy
- KS Pipeline Association
- KDOT
- KDEM
- FEMA Region VII
- KS-CISO ✓
- DHS FPS
- KU Med School
- BARDA ✓
- KDHE
- Poison Control Center
- Safe Schools
- NABC/K-State
- KAHD
- KNG- CDT
- TAG- ATO
- DHS

Local Emergency Operation Plan Status



Status of Local Mitigation Plans in Kansas



Mitigation Highlights

- Funded 174 safe room projects
- Acquisition of over 1,200 flood prone properties
- Warning Siren initiative
- Rural Electric retrofit/upgrades



State Exercises

- Three Tabletop – Cabinet Level (COOP and Pandemic)
  - Policy differences across state agencies
  - Honest examination of essential functions (24/7 ops)
  - Leadership's public communication strategy
- Foreign Animal Disease
  - Focus on Permitted Movement (i.e. Stop movement)
  - In-depth review of State plan
    - Examining authorities & critical functions during an outbreak
    - Developing a new incident management schematic involving regions

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Exercise Initiatives

- Strengthening capabilities for exercise development and simulation
  - Eisenhower Center (didactic and simulation cell)
  - Crisis City (practicum / capstone venue)
- Integrated Emergency Management Courses
  - Community specific pilot (FEB 2011)
  - Lyon County
- Regional/shared exercises
- Increase in support for local exercises

Eisenhower Center

- Facilitated the delivery of 22 courses from the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) providers to 840 Kansas first responders
- Sent 867 Kansas first responders to courses on the campuses of NDPC providers
- Coordinated the delivery and attendance at 48 training or conference events for the 7 Regional Homeland Security Councils

Eisenhower Center

- Conducted 133 FEMA/NIMS emergency management courses to 2,733 participants
- Conducted 5 webinars on NIMS 2010 compliance to 86 participants
- Developed a course specific to the responsibilities of Kansas local emergency managers called "*Emergency Management 101: Everything You Need to Know Before the Next Kansas Disaster*"
- Total of 4,000 trained in COOP



Venues

- Railroad
  - Hazmat
  - Passenger rescue
- Urban village
- Rescue tower
- 2 x Collapsed Structures
- Pipeline
- Aircraft Fuselage
- Agriculture & Farm Safety (in progress)
- K-9 Agility and Directional Courses (in progress)
- Classrooms

Railroad

Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Union Pacific Railroads contributed railcars, locomotive, and track

HAZMAT first responder training, railway disaster scenarios, and joint railroad safety training

Railroad

Salina Fire Department participates in passenger rail rescue at Crisis City – Operation Smoky Hill Exercise



Urban Village

Single-story and multi-story buildings set in an urban environment for first responders, tactical law enforcement, and national guard joint training operations



Technical Rescue Tower

5-story structure for technical rope rescue, SCBA confidence training, and law enforcement tactical training

Collapsed Structures

Two engineered concrete rubble piles simulating collapsed structures.

Available for SAR teams & rescue squads, K9 search teams, technical search, medical & CBRNE teams



Pipeline

Pipeline venue donated by Kansas Pipeline Association.

Public and private first responder and safety personnel training; HazMat and Technical Search and Rescue (confined space – trench); petroleum all-hazard response operations training



Aircraft Fuselage

Dodson International Parts, Inc. donated Jet Commander aircraft fuselage. Joint venture with Salina Airport Authority and Crisis City.

Used by Haz Mat, Search and Rescue, Firefighters, Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) for downed aircraft wide area search; aircraft firefighting techniques; extraction of passengers from downed aircraft.



Main Facility

7,000 square foot facility which is the most environmentally friendly State government building in Kansas
LEED Gold Standard Award Winner – Oct 2010

Crisis City Events

May 2010 – State Fire Marshall Bomb Squad training
- KS Search and Rescue Dog Association K-9 team training

July 2010 – Operation Smoky Hill exercise (KS 1st Responders and NE CERF-P)
Aug 2010 – FEMA Region VII DCO orientation
Sep 2010 – US Army North orientation
- Pottawattamie County Sheriff SWAT orientation
- KHP SRT tactical training
- South Central & Northeast Regional Planning Council meetings
- FEMA Region VII Regional Inter-Agency Steering Committee meeting
- KS Association of Counties orientation

Oct 2010 - KS Conservation Award Winners orientation
- Saline County In-Service Day meeting
- KS Search and Rescue Dog Association K-9 team training
- Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD) demo and training
- KDOT Communications on Wheels (COW) testing and training
- Salina Airport Authority Board meeting and orientation
- North Central Regional Planning Council meeting
- NE Task Force One orientation and scheduling meeting
- KS Corporation Commission Pipeline Seminar

Nov 2010 - 3rd Annual KS Technical Rescue Conference
- KS Search and Rescue Working Group Meeting
- KSNG J4 Logistics Conference
- Regional Council Coordination Committee Leadership Conference
- Pottawattamie County Sheriff SWAT tactical training

Federal Disasters 2010

- 4 major declared disasters
  - DR1860-KS – severe storms/flooding (SEPT 09)
  - DR1868-KS – winter storm (DEC 09)
  - DR1885 – winter storm (FEB 10)
  - DR1932 – severe storms (AUG 10)
- 1 Small Business Administration
- 12 federal disaster declarations open

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

Regional Accomplishments

- Regional Council infrastructure
  - 5 year history and evolution of positive change
  - Multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional solutions
  - Leadership workshops (quarterly) enhances consistency

Regional Accomplishments

- Joint investments
  - Interoperability, Incident Management Teams (IMT), Search & Rescue Teams (SAR) credentialing, planning
- Participated in the State Homeland Security Strategy and State Preparedness Report
- Participated in Statewide Capability Assessment

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Working Groups

- Incident Management Team (IMT)
- Search & Rescue (SAR)
- Law Enforcement
- Geographic Information System
- Credentialing

IMT accomplishments

- 10 IMTs representing each region attended IMT conference in Houston, TX
- Quarterly working group meetings
- 7 of 8 IMT task books have been designed
- 13 position specific and technical trainings offered

IMT accomplishments

- Staff conducted Command and General Staff training to Mississippi staff
- Identification and selection to Type 3 Kansas Team members
- IMT supported "Symphony in Flint Hills"
- Participated in NE CERF-P Exercise at Crisis City
- Participated in "Race Across Kansas"

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IMT accomplishments

- Teams assisted by providing overhead support to KDHE Points-of-Distribution (POD) County exercises
- State teams placed on stand-by for Mississippi and Colorado for imminent threats (hurricane and wildfire)

Goals for 2011

- Further develop the Credentialing and Resource Typing project
- Sponsor 10 delegates to attend the All Hazards Incident Management Team conference in Denver, CO
  - Regions are sending 16 additional personnel
- Support the delivery of more positions specific training
- Continue supporting the working group concept as deployable resources continually advance in capability
- Return to Mississippi to teach another Command and General Staff course
- Formalize and train a Type 3 Incident Management Team and build agreements with contiguous states

Regional and State SAR Task Forces



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SAR accomplishments

- Hosted the 3rd Annual KS Technical Rescue Conference
  - 125 participated
- Participated in NE CERF-P Exercise at Crisis City
- Collapse cameras provided by KDEM
- Response to Russell Grain Elevator collapse

Interoperable Emergency Communications

- Kansas' implementation of the FY2007 Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) Grant is almost complete
  - Nationally, Kansas had the third highest reportable projects with this grant and is one of the leading states on project completion
  - One portion of the statewide system, known as MOTOBRIDGE, is now finished on all sites
    - 14 sites on the 800 MHz system remain to be funded for conversion

KANSAS OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

Statewide Radio System



KANSAS OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

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CommunicationsTraining Initiative

- The communications training initiative was launched in March 2009.
  - All 7 regions and the State cooperated on two communications grant years to launch the program
  - To date, over 4,000 Kansas responders have received communications related training

KANSAS OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

Safety & Preparedness in Kansas Schools
The All-Hazards Approach

Kansas Center for Safe & Prepared Schools

Dr. Bob Hull, Director
Mr. Jerry Tenbrink, Associate Director

KC-SPS Mission

- KC-SPS will provide leadership, training and resources that will sustain and improve the safe and prepared learning environments in Kansas Schools.
- KC-SPS will assist schools in the prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from crisis incidents that impact schools and their communities.

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KC-SPS History

- Formation of working group in response to legislative resolutions #5018 (1999) and #5008 (2003)
- 3 members of working group accepted into KPHLI class
- Capstone Project – Topeka Leadership Summit (2006)
- Recommendations of Leadership Summit

KC-SPS History

- Governor's Executive Order (Fall 2006)
- Creation of Governor's Commission on Healthy & Prepared Schools (2007)
- Formation of Kansas Center for Safe & Prepared Schools in Feb. 2009

House Concurrent Resolution #5018

- The legislature strongly urges all public and private schools to create and update school crisis plans and to facilitate implementation of such plans by training personnel and conducting regular drills. Be it further resolved to deliver copies of this resolution to the Commissioner of Education and the chairperson of the State Board of Education.

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House Concurrent Resolution #5008

- We urge that state and local officials to designate school nurses as first responders to a biological or chemical attack; Further . . . that any legal or regulatory barrier be removed that would prevent a school nurse from responding to a biological or chemical attack; Further that a copy of this resolution be sent to the State Board of Education, the Board of Nursing and KDHE

KC-SPS Duties

- Become the Kansas Clearinghouse for school safety and preparedness
- Create a school crisis management resource center with deployment capabilities
- Provide training and exercise opportunities
- Coordinate standards and expectations for school safety and preparedness

KC-SPS Early Successes

- 250 + Members
- Annual State Convention
- Regional Workshops
- Governor's Proclamation
- Senate Resolution
- Model School Emergency Operation Plans

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

KC-SPS Early Successes

- KC-SPS Working Group
- 3 Kansas Teams
  - Ulysses, Atchison & Winfield
  - Leavenworth-will go to EMI Training March 2011
- Host "*E.M. 101 for Schools*" to U.S. Dept of Education
- School Vulnerability Assessments
  - 30+ Districts

KC-SPS Early Successes

- Invitation to be a working member of the Fusion Center
- Completion of a Doctoral Dissertation @WSU on preparedness
- Published article in the Journal of Business Continuity and Emergency Management by Dr. Hull

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KC-SPS Problem Statement

- Every Kansas educational setting is vulnerable to threats, hazards and disasters that have the potential to disrupt normal school operations and cascade into a crisis situation.
- Kansas schools are not uniformly prepared, resource equipped or trained to respond to these emergency situa

KC-SPS Guiding Principles

- Regardless of current challenges, schools have a duty of care to students, staff and the community
- All schools can implement minimal cost items that improve safety and preparedness
- Advocate for children during times of crisis

KC-SPS Guiding Principles

- Focus on the positive connection between a safe & prepared school and academic success
- A school crisis is a community crisis and a community crisis is a school crisis
- Training, using the all-hazards approach, must be continuous due to staff turnover and changing realities

KC-SPS Guiding Principles

- Clearly state standards, expectations and best practices for school safety and preparedness
- School safety & preparedness is not just an educational responsibility
- Advocate for keeping school law enforcement, school health professionals and mental/emotional health professionals in schools

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What Schools are Telling Us Survey Results

- 46% state they have 'adequate' all hazards school plans
- 12% state they have an annual table top exercise evaluating their crisis plan
- 28% say they meet regularly with local emergency responders and EM's
- 87% stated there is a need for additional crisis management training
- 92% believe a state office that focused on school safety and preparedness would be beneficial to their local school

What Schools are Telling Us Survey Results

- Preparedness is the most important service we can provide for our students and staff
- School staff are first responders. We must train them better
- We need to use the model plan and update our current plan
- We are not prepared in schools and we must become better prepared. . . I need to attend more training like this

Foundations of Preparedness Every Kansas School Needs

- An All-Hazards NIMS & ICS compliant school emergency operations plan (EOP)
- Creation and implementation of a School District and Building level crisis management teams
- Continuous crisis management training and exercising of the school's EOP for all personnel

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KC-SPS Needs for Sustainability

- Legislative foundational authority to establish school preparedness and safety standards
- Resources necessary for KC-SPS and schools to fulfill its mission and responsibilities as established by legislative authority

KC-SPS Needs for Sustainability

- Legislative foundational authority to establish school preparedness and safety standards
- Resources necessary for KC-SPS and schools to fulfill its mission and responsibilities as established by legislative authority

KC-SPS Needs for Sustainability

- Standardization of school drills and skills
- Implementation of preparedness key concepts in the school's curriculum
- Resources to implement plans & training

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Contact Information

- Dr. Bob Hull, Director
  - Kansas Center for Safe & Prepared Schools
  - 785-274-1428; robert.e.hull@us.army.mil
- Mr. Jerry Tenbrink, Associate Directo
  - Kansas Center for Safe & Prepared Schools
  - 785-274-1428; jerry.tenbrink@ksag.org

1-23

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS

Type	Incident Complexity
5	One or two single resources duration usually several hours
4	Several resources – Task Force/Strike Team; usually one operational period
3	Some Command & General Staff; All Hazards IMT extends into multiple operational periods
2	Outside resources to manage Command & General Staff; regional significance
1	Extended operations; extensive resources; Incident of National Significance

Regional and State SAR Task Forces



Source: US Census Bureau, Kansas Division of Emergency Management

Kansas Adjutant General's Department
Geospatial Technologies Section
26 July 2005

SAR TYPE ONE

1/2 of a TYPE ONE



Kansas USAR Task Force
29-35 Members plus Canine Teams & Structure Specialist

K9 Teams (Handler + K9) can be added as needed.
Structure Specialist (Engineer) can be added as needed.

1-26

KANSAS STRUCTURE COLLAPSE



Kansas Structure Collapse Team
14 Members plus Canine Teams & Structure Specialist

K9 Teams (Handler + K9) can be added as needed.
Structure Specialist (Engineer) can be added as needed.

Statewide Radio System



- P-25 DTRS
- SITES ON ORDER
- SITE RELOCATION FROM BUTLER COUNTY
- NO FUNDING IDENTIFIED

KANSAS
OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY
COMMUNICATIONS

Kansas Center for Safe and Prepared Schools



Legend

Homeland Security Regions | Counties | Participant | Non-Participant | ★ Participating Schools

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Kansas Division of Legislative Research, Kansas Adjutant General's Department, Safe and Prepared School Center

Participating Individual Schools/Educational Service Centers

Allen Co - AHW Coop, Humboldt – Crawford Co - Greenbush, Girard – Johnson Co - Kansas School for the Deaf, Olathe – Saline Co - Smoky Hill ESC, Salina – Wyandotte Co - Christ the King School (Archdiocese of Kansas City)

Joint Committee on Kansas Security November 22, 2010

JOINT COMMITTEE ON KANSAS SECURITY

Motion to Close the Open Meeting to Receive Information and Consider Matters Relating to Security of State Officers or Employees, or both, or Security of Buildings and Property Under Ownership or Control of the State of Kansas or Matters Relating to Security Measures.

I move that the open meeting of the Joint Committee on Kansas Security in Room 548-S of the Statehouse be recessed for a closed, executive meeting to commence immediately in Room 548-S of the Statehouse pursuant to Joint Rule 5 of the Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives and subsection (b)(13) of K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 75-4319, for the purpose of consulting with ~~Captain Marc McCune from the Capitol Police~~ Adjutant General Tod Bunting regarding matters (1) relating to the security of ~~state officers or employees, or both, or the security of buildings and property under the ownership or control of the state of Kansas~~ public buildings or facilities, or (2) matters relating to security measures which matters, if discussed at an open meeting would jeopardize such security measures, that the Joint Committee on Kansas Security resume the open meeting in this room, Room 548-S of the Statehouse, at 11:30 AM, and that this motion, if adopted, be recorded in the minutes of the Joint Committee on Kansas Security and be maintained as a part of the permanent records of the Committee. Dan, T.

Adopted at 11:10 on November 22, 2010

Jeremy? Jackson
Abrams Morgan Angee
Chuck
Jerry Tenbrink Jerry Tenbrink
Bill Chornyak Chornyak
Robert
Dr. Hill
Terry Ploger McCool Terri Ploger McCool
Danny Hay Dan Hay

Joint Comm. On Kansas Security
November 22, 2010
Attachment 2

KANSAS
HIGHWAY PATROL

Mark Parkinson, Governor
Terry L. Maple, Superintendent
www.kansashighwaypatrol.org

November 22, 2010

Senator Jay Emler, Chairman
Joint Committee on Kansas Security
Kansas State Capitol
300 SW 10th Street
Topeka, Kansas 66612

Dear Chairman Emler:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the state bomb squad to the Joint Committee on Kansas Security. As there have been important oversight changes regarding the unit, the following information is provided in the interest of updating members of the on the status of this important state capability:

- On June 10th the Kansas State Fire Marshal exercised its right to terminate the Memorandum of Understanding establishing a State Hazardous Devices Unit with the KHP. The termination was effective July 10th.
- On August 10th Governor Parkinson petitioned the Federal Bureau of Investigation to transfer certification of the state's Hazardous Devices Unit from the Fire Marshal to the KHP.
- On September 13th KHP received formal notification Governor Parkinson's request to transfer certification to the KHP was approved by the FBI.
- On September 20th the KHP designates Bomb Squad Commander and Hazardous Devices Supervisor pursuant to FBI directive. A Standard Operating Procedures Guide was developed.
- On September 27th KHP provided FBI correspondence, KHP designation information and draft MOU to KSFM.
- On September 30th KHP selected two additional Troopers to serve as Hazardous device technicians and notifies FBI of desire to send them to Hazardous Devices School. One resides in Independence and the other lives in Scott City.
- On October 29th necessary bomb squad equipment is transferred from the KSFM to the KHP. The FBI was contacted and an inspection and inventory was conducted. The KHP was given approval to respond to calls for service involving explosive devices.

122 SW 7th Street; Topeka, KS 66603 • (785) 296-6800 • Fax:

- On November 8th the KHP announced a Police Service Dog Unit supervisor position. This will allow current supervisor to devote necessary time and attention to serving as Hazardous devices supervisor for the state bomb squad.

- On November 9th the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms personnel conducted a review of KHP explosive storage magazines and sites. All materials and facilities met ATF requirements.

- On November 11th KHP personnel met with other Kansas and Missouri bomb squads during a joint training event hosted by Overland Park Police and Fire officials.

- On November 17th KHP Police Service Dog Instructors attended KCMOPD sponsored training on K-9 Legal issues including explosives related matters.

- On November 18 KHP continue a Basic Explosive dog training and certification course. Members of the Topeka PD, Shawnee County Sheriff and KHP are enrolled in the course.

- On November 19th KHP received verbal notification from the FBI that all necessary reviews had been completed and KHP had been approved for Accredited Status as a state bomb squad. The Accreditation Certificate has been sent to the KC FBI office and should be received this week.

- Also on November 19th the FBI advised that KHP applicants for the Hazardous Devices School will attend training beginning in early to mid January 2011.

In addition to the above noted activities, KHP personnel have also been active in a variety of related areas. They have responded to active bomb threats, assisted with school vulnerability assessments, trained law enforcement officers, worked with other bomb teams, conducted counter terrorism efforts and provided security at athletic events. A copy of a weekly activity report for the Hazardous Devices/Police Service Dog Unit is attached for your review.

Thank you for the opportunity to update the Committee on the activities of the KHP personnel.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Maple

TERRY L. MAPLE, Colonel
Superintendent

TLM:skm

cc: LTC Robert Ladner
Major Alan Stoecklein
Captain Rick Peters
Lieutenant Kyle Moomau

3-2

Kansas Homeland Security Regions

KHP HDU

Northwest Region
Toby Prine
Hays
785-259-5297 (cell)
785-625-3749 (office)
dtprine@agtop.state.ks.us

KHP /NE KS

North Central Region
Dennis Colsden
Salina
785-207-1558 (cell)
785-820-2869 (office)
decolsden@agtop.state.ks.us

NE KS

Northeast Region
Bill Brubaker
Topeka
785-207-0882 (cell)
785-274-1493 (office)
bcbrubaker@agtop.state.ks.us

NE KS

KC Metro Region
Keith Yoder
Olathe
785-207-1576 (cell)
913-782-8872 (office)
kryoder@agtop.state.ks.us



Southwest Region
Matt Mercer
Dodge City
620-253-0128 (cell)
620-338-8726 (office)
memercer@agtop.state.ks.us

KHP HDU

South Central Region
Jim Leftwich
Wichita
316-833-0498 (cell)
316-691-8044 (office)
jtleftwich@agtop.state.ks.us

WICHITA PD

Southeast Region
Jackie Miller
Emporia
620-794-6543 (cell)
620-342-0537 (office)
jsmiller@agtop.state.ks.us

KHP HDQ

Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Kansas Division of Emergency Management

ALL STRIPED AREAS ARE KHP RESPONSE AREAS

Kansas Attorney General's Department
Geospatial Information Systems
June 2007

KHP Hazardous Devices/Police Service Dog Unit
Weekly Report - Confidential Working Papers

Reporting Date: November 11, 2010

Report:

- Terry L. Maple, Colonel
  Kansas Highway Patrol

Agency Matters/Operations:

- November 04 - KHP Drug Detection K9 team responded to assist a trooper conducting a car stop on I-70, in Thomas County. The trooper believed the occupants were involved in criminal activity. The driver refused consent to search of the vehicle. The PSD was deployed and indicated to drug odor. During a subsequent search **15 pounds of marijuana** was located.

- November 04 - **KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams deployed to the Engineered Air Manufacturing complex to assist the Johnson County Sheriff and Plant Officials in response to a bomb threat.** The PSD teams screen vehicles, packages, and other selected areas for explosive material entering or already secreted at their facilities. This was in response to a specific telephonic threat against the plant.

- November 06 - **KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams deployed to Kansas State University Football complex to assist the KSU Police and Athletics** with counter terrorism efforts implemented by them. The PSD teams screen vehicles, packages, and other selected areas for explosive material entering or already secreted at their facilities. This is part of the counter terror plan required for NCAA events of this size and not in response to a specific threat.

- November 08 - KHP PSDU trainer provided maintenance training in the West Region to the following agencies: KHP

- November 08 - **KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams and Hazardous Device Unit personnel had deployed to the Hays School District, USD 489,** to assist the Kansas Homeland Security Vulnerability Assessment Team with efforts implemented by the school leadership to make the schools safer. The assessment teams take an "all hazards" approach while visiting the school facilities. This is a voluntary, no cost program that the schools and KHS partner in. The KHP participation is in support of the Adjutant General's KHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams.

- November 09 - **KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams deployed to the 190th KANG Main Gate to assist the Security Forces with counter terrorism efforts** implemented by them. The PSD teams screen vehicles, packages, and other selected areas for explosive material entering or already secreted at their facilities. This is part of the counter terror plan and not in response to a specific threat.

KHP Hazardous Devices/Police Service Dog Unit
Weekly Report - Confidential Working Papers

- November 09 - KHP Drug Detection K9 team conducted a car stop on I-70, in Ellis County. The trooper believed the occupants were involved in criminal activity. The driver gave consent to search of the vehicle. During a subsequent search **5 pounds of marijuana** was located.

- November 09 - KHP Patrol Dog team responded to assist the **KHP Special response Team executing simultaneous search warrants with the Topeka Police**. The PSD team was utilized for perimeter control in the event the suspect fled on foot. The entry was made and the suspects surrendered without incident to the SRT members.

- November 09 - KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams deployed to **Kansas University Basketball complex to assist the KU Police and Athletics** with counter terrorism efforts implemented by them. The PSD teams screen vehicles, packages, and other selected areas for explosive material entering or already secreted at their facilities. This is part of the counter terror plan required for NCAA events of this size and not in response to a specific threat.

- November 09 - KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams and Hazardous Device Unit personnel had **deployed to the Hays School District, USD 489, to assist the Kansas Homeland Security Vulnerability Assessment Team** with efforts implemented by the school leadership to make the schools safer. The assessment teams take an "all hazards" approach while visiting the school facilities. This is a voluntary, no cost program that the schools and KHS partner in. The KHP participation is in support of the Adjutant General's KHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams. This meeting was to finalize the report before it was formally presented to the USD 489 Superintendent.

- November 09 - KHP PSDU trainer provided maintenance training in the East Region, in Topeka, to the following agencies: **Leavenworth SO, Nemaha SO, Wabaunsee SO, Lyon SO, Pittsburg PD, Emporia PD, and KHP**

- November 09 – KHP **HDU personnel met with ATF regulatory personnel and had ATF conduct a survey of the KHP explosive storage magazines and sites. The ATF advised that the storage facilities meet federal storage regulations.**

- November 09 - KHP Drug Detection K9 team responded to assist a trooper conducting a car stop on I-70, in Wabaunsee County. The trooper believed the occupants were involved in criminal activity. During a subsequent search approximately $10,000 USC was located. The PSD was deployed and indicated to drug odor during a screening of the currency.

- November 10 - KHP Explosives Detector Dog Teams and Hazardous Device Unit personnel had **deployed to the Hays School District, USD 489, to assist the Kansas Homeland Security Vulnerability Assessment Team** with efforts implemented by the school leadership to make the schools safer. The assessment teams take an "all hazards" approach while visiting the school facilities. This is a voluntary, no cost program that the schools and KHS partner in. The KHP participation is in support of the Adjutant General's KHS Vulnerability Assessment Teams. This meeting was to finalize the report before it was formally presented to the USD 489 Superintendent.

KHP Hazardous Devices/Police Service Dog Unit
Weekly Report - Confidential Working Papers

- November 10 - KHP **Explosives Detector Dog Teams deployed to the 190th KANG Main Gate to assist the Security Forces with counter terrorism efforts** implemented by them. The PSD teams screen vehicles, packages, and other selected areas for explosive material entering or already secreted at their facilities. This is part of the counter terror plan and not in response to a specific threat.

- November 11 – KHP **HDU personnel met with Kansas and Missouri Bomb Squads for joint training. The training was hosted by Overland Park PD and FD.** The training focused on equipment maintenance and IDEAL Products, a vendor of bomb squad equipment, demonstrating new equipment and its functions. During this training IDEAL assisted the KHP with trouble shooting a problem with a robot's weapon system.

######

Terry Maple

From: Kyle Moomau
Sent: Monday, August 09, 2010 2:37 PM
To: Terry Maple; Robert D. Ladner; Alan Stoecklein; Richard Peters
Cc: Kyle Moomau; Dale G Brooks Jr.; John T. O'Grady; Roger Maag
Subject: School Assessments

Sirs, The following is the list of the current scheduled school assessments that KHP personnel are involved in:

Seaman, USD 345	8/30/2010	JT O'Grady
Douglas, USD 396	9/14/2010	Dale Brooks
Ottawa, USD 290	10/05/2010	Kyle Moomau
Winfield, USD 465	10/12/2010	Roger Maag
Ft. Scott, USD 234	10/19/2010	Dale Brooks / IT request
Twin Valley, USD 240	10/27/2010	Roger Maag
Hays, USD 489	11/08/2010	JT O'Grady / Red Team / IT request
McPherson, USD 418	11/15/2010	Roger Maag / Red Team / IT request
Arkansas City, USD 470	11/29/2010	Dale Brooks / Red Team / IT request
Sedgwick, USD 439	12/13/2010	Dale Brooks / Red Team / IT request
Osawatomie, USD 367	01/11/2011	Kyle Moomau / IT request
Leavenworth, USD 453	01/24/2011	JT O'Grady
Jefferson Co., USD 340	02/07/2011	JT O'Grady
DeSoto, USD 232	02/22/2011	JT O'Grady / Roger Maag
Haysville, USD 261	Unscheduled	Dale Brooks
Soloman, USD 393	Unscheduled	Roger Maag
Shawnee Hts, USD 450	Complete	
Flint Hills, USD 492	Complete	
Pratt JUCO	Complete	
KCKS Co College	Complete	
SNSO	Complete	

3-7

2009

Kansas Highway Patrol

Troop S

Hazardous Devices Unit
&
Police Service Dog Unit

PATROL DOG CALLS

- 78 OUTSIDE AGENCY REQUESTS
- 27 KHP REQUESTS
- 3 REQUESTS REFUSED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT CRIME SEVERITY
- SEARCH TYPES: 16 TRACKS
  31 BUILDINGS
  41 PERIMETERS (BARRICADES, WARRANTS, SEARCH)
  63 AREAS
  11 VEHICLES (CLEAR VEHICLE AFTER FEL. ARREST)
  13 EVIDENCES SEARCHES / 13 FOUND ITEMS
- 10 FELONY SUSPECTS APPREHENDED DURING SEARCHES (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE CAPTURED DURING SRT OPS)
- 14 DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC

- AGENCIES ASSISTED INCLUDE: TOPEKA PD, SHAWNEE S.O., WICHITA PD, SEDGWICK S.O., LINN S.O., KBI, ARK CITY PD, COWLEY S.O., ANTHONY PD, KIOWA S.O., DICKINSON S.O., NEOSHO S.O., CLAY CENTER PD, OTTAWA S.O., WABAUNSEE S.O., SILVER LAKE PD, DOUGLAS S.O., KS DOC, MARION SO, LENEXA PD

DRUG DOG CALLS

- 27 OUTSIDE AGENCY REQUESTS
- 79 KHP REQUESTS
- 2 REFUSED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT CAUSE TO CALL OUT OFF DUTY PERSONNEL
- SNIFF TYPES: 386 VEHICLES, 3 AREAS, 3459 ARTICLES, 30 BUILDINGS
- ITEMS SEIZED DURING THESE CALLS:
  1047 LBS. MARIJUANA
  159 LBS. COCAINE
  1.1 LBS. METHAMPHETAMINE
  $3,546,729 USD
  5 VEHICLES

- AGENCIES ASSISTED INCLUDE: TOPEKA PD, SHAWNEE S.O., JEFFERSON S.O., POTT. S.O., ATCHISON S.O., PERRY H.S., OSKALOOSA H.S., ATCHISON CO. H.S., DEA, ELLIS SO, ELLSWORTH SO, MCPHERSON SO, JACKSON SO

EXPLOSIVE RELATED CALLS

BOMB DOG CALLS

- 225 OUTSIDE AGENCY REQUESTS
- 123 KHP REQUESTS
- 2 REFUSED DUE TO REFUSAL TO EVACUATE DURING THE SWEEP
- SNIFF TYPES: 3871 VEHICLES, 560 AREAS, 5929 ARTICLES, 83 BLDGS.
- SWEEP TYPES: 271 PREVENTIVE, 10 PROTECTIVE, 9 THREATS
- ITEMS LOCATED DURING THESE CALLS: 1 LB. SMOKELESS POWDER
- AGENCIES ASSISTED INCLUDE: TOPEKA PD, SHAWNEE S.O., JEFFERSON S.O., POTT. S.O., ATCHISON S.O., PERRY H.S., OSKALOOSA H.S., ATCHISON CO. H.S., KBI, USSS, DOD, USAF, KU, KSU, MTAA, USMS, COLUMBUS PD, SALINA AIRPORT AUTH, MANHATTAN AIRPORT AUTH, WICHITA PD, ATF, RILEY CO. PD, MID-CONT AIRPORT , OVERLAND PARK PD, MTAA, KANG, TSA, DHS, FBI
- SCHOOLS ASSISTED INCLUDE: FLINT HILLS JOB CORPS, MANHATTAN HS, OSKALOOSA HS, VALLEY FALLS HS, JEFFERSON WEST, WINFIELD HS, MULVANE HS, KU, KSU

HAZARDOUS DEVICE TECHNICIAN CALLS

- 6 DEVICE RESPONSE CALLS
    1. 20 mm ROUND, RSP AND RELEASED TO TPD (FOUND IN A SEIZED CAR AT KHP IMPOUND)
    2. GRENADE FUZES, RSP AND RELEASED TO USAF EOD (FOUND IN A GARAGE IN INDEPENDENCE, KS.)
    3. PIPE BOMB, RSP ON SITE, (FOUND IN A RESIDENCE IN FULTON, KS)
    4. PIPE BOMB, RSP ON SITE, (FOUND DURING METH RAID AT RESIDENCE NEAR YATES CENTER)
    5. PIPE BOMB, RSP ON SITE, (FOUND DURING TRAFFIC STOP NEAR LARNED)
    6. SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE, RSP ON SITE, (FOUND BY KDOT WORKERS AT SOLOMON REST AREA)
    7. KU SUSPISIOUS PKG
    8. KSU SUSPICIOUS PKG
- 9 BOMB THREAT CALLS
- 2 DEMONSTRATIONS
- 2 DISPOSALS (52 STICKS OF DYNAMITE – ERIE, KS. / 1,000 LBS. AMFO FROM MO. HP TO FT. RILEY EOD TO BE DISPOSED)

EXPOSIVES RELATED TRAINING PROVIDED

- KHP HAZARDOUS DEVICE TECHNICIANS PROVIDED TRAINING TO THE FOLLOWING GROUPS:
  SW REGION HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL
  NC REGION HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL
  KHP TROOPERS
  ADVANCED CRIMINAL INTERDICTION (COLORADO SP)
  SHAWNEE SO SWAT
  SHAWNEE HTS FD
  LINDSBORG FD
  KHP BOMB DOG HANDLERS AND TRAINERS
  OKLAHOMA HP BOMB DOG TRAINERS

HOW HDU OPERATIONS ARE LINKED TO KHP OPERATIONS

1. The HDU and PSDU became linked through the bomb dog program. The bomb dogs deploy on several hundred sniffs each year and screen thousands of items. During these sniffs we are in the detection phase. If it was a generalized preventive sweep and a positive indication was received for bomb odor then we would enter the mitigation phase The handler entering the bags, without the benefit of bomb technician training, was not safe. It was decided that it would be practical for the bomb dog handler be trained as a technician. This allows the detection phase to stop and the mitigation phase to begin without delay. If the technician is not on scene then the wait may be hours. When the handlers are technicians the time delay is minimal. It is also efficient manpower usage. The two operational phases, detection and mitigation, do not overlap. When a Device or suspicious package is discovered the detection phase halts and the mitigation phase begins. Bomb dogs do not clear suspicious packages, it may be an explosive it is not trained to detect. A suspicious package is cleared by a technician. This occurs routinely.
   The PSD/HDU and Breaching is a practical administrative tool also since all the explosives the agency possesses are under one inventory system and chain of command. The additional benefit is that the knowledge base of the individual is greater and that combined knowledge is used in all disciplines.

2. The HDU and Aircraft are linked by the rapid response capability that the helicopters and fixed wing provide. The helicopters transport PSD teams and HDU teams to the scenes of threats and devices. The HDU and Aircraft also collaborate during Protective Operations. SRT is also involved in these protective operations. The Aircraft units provide observation and reporting support to forewarn the SRT with the Protectee and/or provide information to the HDU/PSD teams of suspicious vehicles, persons, or items that may not be observed from the sight plane of the ground personnel. This forewarning can be lifesaving.

3. The HDU and SRT are linked through the explosive breaching program and Operator training and deployments. The HDU Technicians are trained as Response Team Operators by the SRT. This is done so they can conduct breaching operations for SRT and deploy safely in that environment. When the breach is complete they augment the entry team. If a breach charge fails to initiate a trained technician is there to make it the failed charge safe and continue the operation. This is rare, but we plan for what can go wrong. The HDU technicians also provide training to the SRT members regarding: IED recognition, component recognition, explosive clandestine laboratories, commercial explosives, and booby trap recognition and emergency mitigation procedures. The SRT responds to scenes where the bomb building suspect is still at large. This provides well trained individuals, with explosives training, to secure the perimeter while the HDU mitigates the IED. All KHP HDU personnel must maintain SRT physical standards.

4. The HDU and the KHP Training Center are linked through Technicians providing training courses in: Explosive Recognition (commercial and homemade) and explosive device components, bomb threat response procedures and recognizing explosive Clan Labs. These courses are given to all Advanced and Basic Criminal Interdiction Course attendees and to Agencies on an individual request basis. These courses are offered to Law Enforcement, Fire Departments, and Regional Homeland Security Professionals. The courses are provided at the Training Center or at the requester's venue.

5. The HDU and the KHP Statewide Communications Center are linked through the call out and notifications procedures. The Comm. Center has a list of all the HDU personnel's contact numbers, as well as a list of all Bomb Squads in Kansas. The Bomb Squad list provides the areas of responsibility by county and/or city, as well as the back up squad for the primary squad (see attached). The Comm. Center is a central clearing house for: Bomb Squads contacts, CBRNE contacts, medical response, and additional law enforcement assets, including SRT, K9, Aircraft, and military support. The Comm. Center is capable of remote dispatch procedures and patching multiple agencies together on a usable comm. network. This facilitates rapid response and eliminates confusion and doing the same work twice. All of this through one phone number 24 hours a day.

6. The HDU and the CHART (Critical Highway Accident Reconstruction Team) Are linked through their forensic crime scene mapping abilities. This asset routinely deploys in support of agencies to map large and complex crime scenes.

7. The HDU and the Road Trooper assist each other on the road and in training. All troopers receive training form the HDU personnel regarding explosive recognition (commercial and homemade) and explosive device components, bomb threat response procedures, and recognizing explosive Clan Labs. These courses are given to all troopers at the KHPTC. The road troopers often initiate cases or are working with the local authorities on explosive related cases. They will make a rapid response to the scene and ensure that it remains safe and secure until HDU personnel arrive on scene. The number of KHP personnel allow the rotation of personnel for operations during inclimate weather or long duration.

OTHER AGENCIES THE HDU AND EXPLOSIVES PSDs SUPPORT;

1. TSA / OPERATION VIPR - REGIONAL AIRPORTS, AMTRAK, GREYHD
2. USMS / SWEEPS OF FED COURTHOUSE
3. DOD PROTECTIVE SERVICES / PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
4. KNG / VEHICLE SCREENING AT ENTRY GATE
5. USSS / PROTECTIVE SWEEPS
6. KHS / VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS – SCHOOLS, LEAs
7. Ks. Adj. General - FUSION CENTER – (KHP Tech assigned to review threats and advise the Fusion Center Staff / this Tech has an existing military clearance allowing him to review material)
8. See attached explosive related calls for 2010

STATE OF KANSAS
OFFICE OF THE FIRE MARSHAL

MARK PARKINSON
GOVERNOR

DAN McLAUGHLIN
FIRE MARSHAL

700 SW Jackson, Suite 600
Topeka, KS 66603-3714
Voice: 785.296.3401
Fax: 785.296.0151
www.accesskansas.org/firemarshal

Testimony before the 2010 Joint Committee on Kansas Security

Update on Kansas Bomb Squad Capabilities

By Dan McLaughlin, State Fire Marshal

November 22, 2010

I would like to thank you Chairman Emler and the committee for the opportunity to provide an update on where our agency is in regards to the State Bomb Squad.

While a lot of information has been provided about the unit, I do not believe the timeline of the unit from the beginning has been included.

- In the spring of 2002 our agency researched the need for a statewide bomb unit.
- We received a Byrne Grant in the fall of 2002 to expand the explosive program and to assist in the development of a statewide bomb unit.
- Due to anticipated call load we thought we needed additional manpower and decided to reach out to other state agencies to see if there was an interest.
    - Kansas Bureau of Investigation's (KBI) administration was not interested.
    - Kansas Highway Patrol's (KHP) administration was interested.
- In 2005 a memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed between the Kansas State Fire Marshal's Office (KSFM) and KHP creating a joint state bomb unit.
- Following the training of the team members in July of 2007 KSFM received accreditation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- The unit then trained monthly and awaited additional equipment.
- In April 2008 the unit was fully operational as a FBI type II bomb squad/explosives team.
- Starting in the fall of 2008 the team had difficulties working together, and the members started training and responding separately by agency.

- In November of 2009 there was a meeting held to attempt to rectify the differences that were causing the division of the team.

- During the 2010 legislative budget hearings questions arose about the bomb unit and if it should be moved from KSFM to KHP. We provided a great deal of information and I met with interested committee members regarding the logistics with the recommendation that the unit continue at KSFM. In the end there were no recommendations by any committee to move the bomb unit.

- Due to continued issues we chose to sever the MOA with KHP effective July 10, 2010. With the increase of trained personnel there was no projected impact on the team's ability to respond statewide.

- In a letter dated August 10, 2010 to the FBI Governor Parkinson requested that the certification for the unit be moved from KSFM to KHP. Between the two agencies and the FBI's help he did not believe the current level of response would decrease and the citizens of the State of Kansas would continue to be protected.

As of today we are currently making changes to the MOA from the KHP that we would like to see incorporated. While our bomb unit members are prepared to serve, this process has to be finalized before they can once again serve Kansas citizens in their time of need.

Wind Power Development and Military Installations

INFORMATION BRIEFING
November 2010

Presentation Outline

- Economic impact of DoD and wind power in Kansas
- Potential conflict issues: Radar & Airspace Interference
- Kansas specific maps
- Existing process and DOD initiatives
- Testimony from Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations & Environment)
- Takeaways

5-3

Economic Impacts From Kansas Military Ops

- Estimated 2006 combined total impact of KS military ops to GSP = at least $7.7 billion or 7 percent of GSP
- In 2006, military directly & indirectly supported 170,000 jobs (7.4% of KS employment) with $5.7 billion in wages (5.8% of state earnings)
- Total 2006 fiscal impact (tax revenues) to cities, counties and state estimated at $393.6 million

Economic Impacts From Kansas Wind Energy

- Increased wind generation capacity to 7,158 MW by 2030 (currently 1,012 MW) creates 22,000, 1-2 year jobs (wind turbine construction) and 3,100 long-term jobs
- Annual payments to landowners of $19 million
- Annual local property tax revenues of $20.8 million
- Benefits to local economy (construction phase)
  - Direct Impacts $1.35 billion
  - Indirect Impacts $984 million
- Benefits to local economy (operational phase)
  - Direct Impacts $152 million per year
  - Indirect Impacts $119 million per year

5-5

HEADLINES !!

- Can wind turbines and military radar co-exist? (Nov 2006)
- Wind-power projects halted--could interfere with military radar (June 2006)
- Wind farm plans stir up storm over military radar (March 2010)
- Proposed wind farm could impact Air Force Base (Aug 2009)
- Environmental Impact Study released for low-flight training proposal (Aug 2009)
- Wind farm could cause fighter jet crashes (Dec 2009 – England)

5-4

Potential Issue 1 -- Radar Interference



Type 101 Mobile Air Defense Radar


Radar Beam from Doppler Radar
Intercepted by Wind Turbine Rotor
1580 ft MSL
1022 ft MSL
1170 ft MSL
Butler Ridge
Wind Farm
(36 turbines)
958 ft MSL
MKX Doppler Radar
30 miles



REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES

The Effect of Windmill Farms On Military Readiness

2006

Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

2006 DoD Report to Congress
The Effect of Wind Farms on Military Readiness

5-10

EFFECTS OF WIND TURBINES ON RADAR SURVEILLANCE



5-11



Potential Issue 2 – Airspace Interference

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT)



5-12

5-13

Relative Sizes of Wind Turbines - proportionally scaled



5-14

What does the future hold?

5-15



What does the future hold?

5-16



What does the future hold?

Joby Energy Airborne Wind Turbine Concept.flv

What does the future hold?

5-18

Is this an issue for our state?

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT)

S-19

Wind Speed and Special Use Airspace (SUA)



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5-20

Wind Speed and Military Training Routes (MTR)



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S-21

Special Use Area (SUA) and Military Training Routes (MTR)



Existing Process

- DoD currently relies on FAA's Obstacle Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis (OE/AAA) process to identify and prevent potential interference problems
  - Demonstrate DoD Preliminary Screening Tool
    - Long Range Radar
    - Military Operations
    - NEXRAD

5-23

DoD Initiatives

- Military Installation and Regional Office Outreach
  - Community, GMC, KS Interagency Working Group for Wind Energy, AWEA, NCSL, CSG, NACo, NARUC, NASEO, etc.
- Some federal officials suggested DoD institute its own regulatory process
- DoD improving process for reviewing potential projects
  - Confidential consultation
  - Single point of contact
  - Improve FAA information & process
- Technological options and radar upgrades

5-24

Dr. Dorothy Robyn, DUSD (I&E)

(29 June 2010 Testimony before House Committee on Armed Services)

- Above all, we must maintain the capabilities needed to defend the nation, including our surveillance network and our irreplaceable test and training ranges. At the same time, DoD strongly supports the development of renewable energy
- The vast majority of all wind turbine projects raise no concerns for DoD, and for those that do, we can generally find a way to mitigate the problem
- Although individual conflicts may be unavoidable, the country should not and does not have to choose between national security and the development of renewable energy

5-25

Dyess AFB



Photo Courtesy AWEA and Abigail Vander Hamm

5-26

Takeaways

- Encourage coordination with DoD early in the development process to address potential conflicts
- DoD is engaged in outreach on many fronts
- DoD is not currently seeking regulatory authority and supports responsible renewable energy development
- Currently relying on FAA review process, but DoD is looking for appropriate ways to enhance the process
- DoD has created a single point of contact.

S-27

DoD Point of Contact:

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Washington DC 20301-3400

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Kansas DoD Contacts:

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- Dave Snodgrass, Deputy Director and Acting Region 7 Coordinator – david.snodgrass@us.army.mil
- Stan Rasmussen, Regional Counsel – stanley.rasmussen@us.army.mil
- Office Phone 816.389.3548

HOLD UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE

Statement of

Dr. Dorothy Robyn
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)

Before the
House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness

Impact of Wind Farms on Military Readiness

June 29, 2010

5-29

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the impact of wind turbines on military readiness. As the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, I co-chair a standing group whose charter is to protect the Department of Defense test, training and launch ranges. I am accompanied by Major General Lawrence Stutzriem, the Director of Strategy, Policy and Plans for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). As you know, NORAD is a U.S. and Canadian organization co-located with USNORTHCOM and charged with providing aerospace warning and control and maritime warning to protect North America; USNORTHCOM's primary mission is homeland defense. Together with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NORAD and USNORTHCOM oversee a worldwide system of long-range radars and sensors that support their closely linked missions. Gen. Stutzriem and I both have spent considerable time dealing with the issue that is the focus of today's hearing, and we are gratified by the Committee's interest.

Introduction

I would like to begin with a recent example of the challenge and opportunity the Department of Defense faces. On March 1, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a Notice of Presumed Hazard for a proposed 338-turbine wind farm in north central Oregon, based largely on an objection from NORAD and USNORTHCOM. The two agencies were concerned that the proposed project—on top of the 1800 turbines already constructed and the others already approved for construction in that region—would create electromagnetic interference sufficient to impair the effectiveness of the long-range surveillance radar near Fossil, Oregon.

The FAA decision brought to a halt a major renewable energy project, Shepherds Flat, that had been underway for five years (construction of the turbines was set to begin in May) and that had attracted several hundred million dollars in investment. The ensuing controversy led to extensive discussions between DoD and both project advocates (Caithness Energy and General Electric) and other federal agencies. It also prompted a great deal of analysis and discussion within the Department. Among other things, in late April, we commissioned a 60-day study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory to identify measures that could mitigate the electromagnetic interference.

On April 30, DoD withdrew its objection to the project based largely on two considerations. One, internal DoD analysis indicated that the impact of the additional turbines would not be as severe as initially thought. Two, the Department was optimistic that Lincoln Lab would be able to identify mitigation measures—measures that could be implemented during the 18 months it would take the developer to construct the turbines.

DoD's (initial) objection to the Shepherds Flat project was something of an exception: the vast majority of all wind turbines proposed through the OE/AAA process raise no concerns for the Department, and for those that do raise concerns, we can generally find a way to mitigate the problem. Objections by the Department could become more common, however. Some areas such as the Mojave Desert in which DoD does significant radar-dependent testing and training are prime areas of interest for wind energy developers. And in a growing number of regions such as the Columbia River Gorge and the Great Lakes, the cumulative impact of turbines is

reaching a threshold point for the surveillance radars that NORAD, USNORTHCOM and DHS maintain. (Soon after DoD withdrew its objection to the Shepherds Flat project, the FAA issued a Notice of Presumed Hazard on another proposed wind farm near the Fossil, Oregon, long-range radar based on a similar objection by NORAD and USNORTHCOM.)

This creates a dilemma for the Department. Above all, we must maintain the capabilities needed to defend the nation, including our surveillance network and our irreplaceable test and training ranges. At the same time, the Department strongly supports the development of renewable energy and is a recognized leader in the use of solar, geothermal, wind and other renewable sources. The use of renewable energy at forward operating bases can reduce the need for electricity powered by fuel, which costs lives as well as dollars to transport to theater. (One commanding general in Iraq famously challenged the Department to "unleash us from the tether of fuel.") Greater reliance on distributed renewable energy sources can help our domestic installations maintain mission-critical activities in the event of disruption to the commercial electricity grid. More broadly, the development of clean energy can reduce our country's dependence on fossil fuels and mitigate the effects of global climate change which, as our Quadrennial Defense Review made clear, are themselves national security challenges.

My fundamental message today is that the Department of Defense believes that it can and must minimize the occurrence of incidents like Shepherds Flat, where DoD's mission needs conflict with the development of renewable energy. Although individual conflicts may be unavoidable, the country should not and does not have to choose between national security and the development of renewable energy.

Three steps are key. First, the federal government needs to improve the renewable energy project siting process, so that potential interference can be identified early and mitigated more easily. Second, DoD and other key agencies need to realign their research and development priorities so as to give more attention to this issue, recognizing that a critical protection for our mission interests is the ability to mitigate potential interference by technological means. Third, DoD and other agencies should look at the current plan for upgrading older surveillance radar with an eye to whether the schedule is sufficiently aggressive and the improved technology will adequately mitigate wind turbine interference.

Below, I briefly discuss the technical problem posed by wind turbine interference. I then review concerns with the process for federal approval of wind projects, which exacerbates the conflicts between wind energy and military requirements and makes them more difficult to mitigate. Finally, I outline what the Department is doing to address these problems.

The Technical Problem

Wind turbines can interfere with the effectiveness of radar and other electromagnetic systems that are critical to national security. Although solar towers and even buildings can cause interference, wind farms are the most common source of the problem. Wind turbines interfere with radar in two ways. One is blockage, which results when wind turbines keep the radar system's microwave signals from reaching their intended targets. The other form of interference

is "clutter," which is created by unwanted reflections of the radar signals from wind turbine towers and their moving blades. The blockage and clutter that turbines create reduce the sensitivity and performance of the radar, producing shadowed areas and false targets that make it difficult or impossible for the radar operator to see an actual target.

For DoD, the problem arises in two different contexts. The first involves the long-range radars managed by NORAD and USNORTHCOM to maintain airspace surveillance and air defense. These FAA radars are decades old and many still use analog signal processors, which are inherently less effective at removing wind turbine clutter. Although all long-range radars lose targets and have tracking problems in the vicinity of wind turbines, advanced digital signal processors on newer radar systems perform better than their analog counterparts and can be upgraded more easily through improved software.

Second, wind turbines can affect DoD's test and training missions. When DoD tests a new weapon system, it must have an electromagnetically pristine environment in which to collect baseline data about the performance and characteristics of the weapon. Interference from nearby wind farms can compromise the telemetry, tracking radar and other electromagnetic systems used to conduct these tests. Likewise, the Department's training mission can suffer when air traffic control radars used to train pilots are degraded by wind turbine clutter and shadowing.

Although scientists have a reasonably good understanding of the technical problem, more research is needed to identify technological means to mitigate the impact of wind turbines on radar systems. One promising avenue is advancements in signal processing, which allow the removal of known false targets when the raw data collected by the radar is transformed into a visual display. The federal government also needs more sophisticated tools for estimating the impact of a proposed wind farm on specific radar systems. Current tools have low fidelity and are inherently subjective; at best, they are blunt instruments.

Concerns with the Siting Review Process

DoD relies primarily on the FAA's Obstacle Evaluation/Airport Airspace Analysis (OE/AAA) process to identify and prevent potential interference problems. The OE/AAA process was established in the 1960s primarily to identify proposed towers, buildings and other objects that could reduce airspace safety, and it has not been updated to reflect current national security needs and operations. Under the OE/AAA process, a developer must give the FAA only 30 days notice of the start of construction. This timing reflects the FAA's principal concern with air safety and air space conflicts: the FAA needs to know the exact coordinates of a proposed object, which may not be finalized until close to the start of construction. Moreover, most air space conflicts can be resolved relatively easily and thus need not hold up construction. By contrast, when DoD raises a concern at this late stage, particularly on something like a large wind farm project, which has by then secured environmental permits and substantial capital backing, it can create serious financial and execution challenges for the developer.

To help avoid this problem, DoD has posted a red-yellow-green map on the OE/AAA web page to notify developers of potential conflicts with long-range radars. (For example, the region

around Fossil, Oregon, has for several years been shaded yellow, which indicates that additional turbines may pose a conflict.) In addition, military base and range commanders try to identify planned renewable projects well before they reach the FAA, by engaging with local and regional planning officials and development approval authorities among others. These outreach efforts do not always succeed, however, because of developers' desire to protect proprietary information. Moreover, communication between an installation and a developer is not always adequate. In the Shepherds Flat case, the developer received a green light from a local Air Force base and mistakenly interpreted that to be an Air Force-wide position.

Even when DoD learns of a project only after it has been filed with the FAA, we work with the developer to alleviate conflicts. To date, these efforts have been largely successful. Absent the kind of changes discussed below, however, the number of projects raising DoD concerns will likely increase, as developers take advantage of time-limited grants and tax subsidies and as the number of turbines in specific areas reaches a threshold impact.

In addition to the timing problem, the Department may have another concern with the OE/AAA process: the underlying statutory and regulatory language may not be sufficiently broad or explicit to handle concerns related to our test and training mission. To date, the FAA has supported DoD's interests, as is appropriate given that the Department of Transportation's mission includes protection of national security. Nevertheless, the two departments need to work together to ensure that the OE/AAA process adequately covers all of our missions.

Finally, it is worth noting that the siting review process is most conducive to early cooperation and successful mitigation if the project—or a right-of-way-access to the project—is to be built on public land. First, there is a single landowner, which simplifies the process. DoD has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the largest federal landholder, to evaluate and resolve conflicts on the land it manages, and we anticipate entering similar agreements with other federal agencies. Second, because the developer must get a right of way or lease from the public landowner well before it goes to the FAA, DoD gets what amounts to an early notification of the proposed project.

By comparison, early identification and resolution of conflicts is more difficult when the project is to be built on private land and requires no right-of-way on public land. In some counties and states, developers and landowners do not have to file a land-use permit or notification prior to going to the FAA. Thus, DoD may not learn of a project until shortly before groundbreaking. (In the case of Shepherds Flat, the county required that the developer have a green light from the FAA before it would grant the necessary permits. Nevertheless, NORAD and USNORTHCOM did not learn of the project until the developer filed with the FAA.)

Fixing the Problem

The problems described above are serious but solvable. Along with other federal agencies, the Defense Department needs to move out on several parallel tracks. Let me first describe what is needed, conceptually. Then I will summarize some of the concrete steps that DoD and other federal agencies are taking.

First and most immediately, the federal government needs to improve the process for reviewing renewable projects, so that potential interference can be identified early and mitigated more easily. One, there needs to be a mechanism for early and confidential consultation between individual energy developers and the Department of Defense. Two, to facilitate that consultation and negotiation process, the Department needs to have a single point of contact on renewable energy siting. Three, the scope of the OE/AAA process may need to be expanded to address national security concerns that are not currently covered. Some federal officials have suggested that DoD institute its own regulatory process rather than rely on the FAA and other federal agencies that review proposed renewable energy projects. However, the Department does not want to become a regulator, nor does the wind energy community want us to take on that role.

Second, the key federal agencies, including DoD, need to realign their research and development priorities to give greater attention to this issue. Even with an improved renewable energy siting process, DoD will have to contend with potential electromagnetic "encroachment" from wind turbines and other structures. Technology must become one of the military's primary means of protection in this domain as in other domains. The R&D should address modeling tools to estimate the impact of proposed structures as well as mitigation technology itself.

Third, federal agencies should look at the current plan for upgrading the older surveillance radar. At least two question merit analysis. One, is the current schedule for upgrading the radar sufficiently aggressive (e.g., the Service Life Extension Program, or SLEP, for the Fossil, Oregon, long-range radar is scheduled for 2014)? Two, will the technology slated for insertion as part of the SLEP do an adequate job of mitigating wind turbine interference?

DoD and other federal agencies are taking a number of concrete steps along these lines, partly in response the Shepherds Flat controversy. With respect to improving the project siting review process, three developments are worth noting. First, the National Security Council (NSC) recently initiated an interagency process to review the OE/AAA process and consider options for improving it and updating it with an eye to current and future national security interests. This interagency effort is examining both short-term and longer-term changes to the review structure.

Second, within the Department, I am working with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the Principal Deputy Director for Operational Test and Evaluation to establish a central clearinghouse for DoD's evaluation of proposed wind energy projects. Although the clearinghouse will cover other forms of renewable energy as well, we anticipate that wind energy will be its major focus. Our goal is to create a streamlined, transparent and "layered" process—i.e., one that can approve easy cases quickly and apply increasingly sophisticated tools to the harder ones.

We are currently defining the organizational and management requirements to implement this clearinghouse. A key requirement is to do outreach to the energy industry to encourage developers to come to us early in the development process. Toward that end, we are looking at whether we need statutory or other authority to protect proprietary project information. In addition to outreach, we will need to conduct "in-reach" to let military service and defense

agency staff know that this DoD office is available to support their mission in the broader context of our nation's goal to expand renewable energy resources.

Third, we plan to hold a multi-session "dialogue" with outside groups, including the wind industry and its major trade association, the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA); conservation and environmental groups; landowner representatives; and state and local groups. Our proposed changes to DoD and interagency processes should not occur in a vacuum but rather be developed based on input from interested parties. We are already collaborating with a number of these groups: for example, we are working informally with conservation and environmental organizations among others to develop a set of voluntary siting criteria for permitting authorities to use in their project review process. Our planned dialogue will formalize and expand this collaborative process.

With respect to research and development, we are pursuing multiple initiatives as well. First, as one immediate offshoot of the NSC-led interagency committee described above, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has convened an interagency group to develop a plan for R&D on the wind turbine-radar interference problem. The plan will include mitigation technologies such as advanced digital signal processing as well as models and metrics with which to better estimate the impact of a proposed wind farm on a specific type of radar.

Second, DHS will soon award a contract to develop an iterative, three-dimensional model to characterize the impact of wind turbines on long-range radars. The model's specifications were developed by a wide range of stakeholders, including DoD, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the FAA and AWEA.

Finally, the Department is taking steps to make the turbine-radar issue a research priority. For example, NORAD/NORTHCOM has included its surveillance mission on its Integrated Priority List, which provides guidance for how the Services should allocate their R&D resources. This is a necessary step in getting the Air Force Research Laboratory and other DoD R&D offices to see the turbine-radar issue as mission-relevant.

Conclusion

To maintain military readiness and homeland defense, the Department must protect its irreplaceable test and training ranges and maintain its radar-based surveillance network. At the same time, we support the development of wind energy as a means toward greater energy security goals, among other goals. These two sets of goals can and should be compatible, and I have identified the broad changes necessary to reduce current conflicts. We look forward to working with the Congress to implement these changes.

Renewable Energy and Economic Potential in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota

Center for Rural Affairs, August 2009

The most important issue awaiting action by this Congress for rural development in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota is renewable energy legislation.

Expanding production of renewable electricity to 20% of the nation's electrical generation has the potential to create a large number of new jobs in the rural Midwest and Great Plains, according to unpublished analysis from the US Department of Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory. The analysis projects that Kansas would gain nearly 3,100 long-term jobs in operations and maintenance of wind farms, Nebraska over 3,500 jobs, South Dakota over 3,900 jobs and Iowa over 9,000 jobs. Nationally, the analysis projects, 1.75 million FTE construction phase jobs and 1.6 million new, permanent operational phase jobs would be created.

In addition, Kansas is projected to gain over 23,000 short-term constructions jobs averaging one year in duration, Nebraska nearly 26,000, South Dakota over 29,000 and Iowa over 63,000 short-term construction jobs.

The state-by-state projections were prepared in conjunction with the Laboratory's report *20% Wind by 2030,* but never formally published. Those projections forms the basis for the state facts sheets included in this report. The projections are available from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory or the Center for Rural Affairs.

The analysis did not project jobs created in individual counties. Nevertheless, a review of the wind resource maps published in *20% Wind by 2030* demonstrates that the four states' best wind resources are widely dispersed primarily in their non-metropolitan counties.

In each of these states, more than two-thirds of non metropolitan counties lost population from April 2000—July 2008, according to the most recent *Population Estimates* of the US Census Bureau. As a group, rural counties in these states have per capita incomes far below those in the states' metropolitan counties.

State	Total Jobs Construction Phase	Total Jobs Operational Phase	Total Jobs
Iowa	63,401	9,011	72,412
Kansas	22,683	3,093	25,776
Nebraska	25,988	3,558	29,546
South Dakota	27,284	3,916	31,200
Total	139,356	19,578	158,934

Table 1. Total new jobs (direct, indirect and induced) for construction and operational phases of wind energy production

State	Landowner Payments (per year)	Property Tax Revenue (per year)	Local Economy Benefit—construction (per year)	Local Economy Benefit—operational (per year)	Total Economic Effect (per year)
Iowa	$ 53.0	$ 89.6	$3.125 B	$ 758.6	$4.026 B
Kansas	$ 19.0	$ 20.8	$1.167 B	$ 271	$1.477 B
Nebraska	$ 21.0	$ 31.0	$1.345 B	$ 312	$1.709 B
South Dakota	$ 21.5	$ 39.3	$1.300 B	$ 317	$1.677 B
Total	$114.5	$180.7	$6.937 B	$1.658 B	$ 8.889 B

Table 2. Total economic effects (direct, indirect and induced) for construction and operational phases of wind energy production

Notes: 1) dollars are in millions, unless otherwise noted (B = billion); 2) the construction phase one to two years, so construction phase benefit to local economies is divided in half to make that figure comparable with other per year figures; 3) totals are rounded to the million dollar figure

Renewable Energy and Economic Potential in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota

Center for Rural Affairs, August 2009

Wind development offers a rare opportunity to reinvigorate these rural counties by creating new jobs that pay well. Long-term jobs in maintenance and operation of wind farms average over $20 per hour, Jobs and Economic Development Impact Model (JEDI).

Whether the potential for wind energy to revitalize the rural areas of these four states is realized depends in large measure on the fate of federal renewable energy legislation, especially in the United States Senate. There, the *American Clean Energy Leadership Act* has stalled after being weakened to gain passage by the Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

The Act would facilitate development of a national interstate electric transmission grid to move electricity from areas that have the resources for renewable production to areas with high demand. It would be tailor-made for moving wind from the wind rich Great Plains to the nation's population centers. The costs of developing the grid would be shared among all beneficiaries, including both electricity producers and consumers.

The bill also includes a critically important Renewable Electricity Standard. It would ostensibly require that 12 percent of the nation's electric generation come from renewable sources, including wind, solar, geothermal, new hydroelectric, biomass and landfill generation, by the year 2021.

However, a National Renewable Energy Laboratory study, *Comparative Analysis of Three Proposed Federal Renewable Electricity Standards,* concludes that the legislation would effectively require renewable production of less than 10 percent of nation's electricity by the year 2021. That is less renewable electricity production than the study projects in its baseline, which assumes that Congress takes no action to promote renewable production of electricity.

There is likely to be an effort to raise the standard when the *American Clean Energy Leadership Act* comes before the full Senate, and it will likely be described as an environmental measure. And in many respects it is. But to rural people in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota, it is unprecedented once-in-a-lifetime federal legislation to create genuine economic opportunity and a better future in their communities.

The following pages will take a deeper look at the job creation, economic impact, and wind resources in each of the select states.

Kansas

Renewable electricity in the form of wind energy development means increased economic opportunity in rural Kansas. A U.S. Department of Energy Study (*20% Wind by 2030*) concluded that ramping up wind generation to 20 percent of the nation's electricity would create nearly 3,100 long-term jobs in Kansas and over 22,000 jobs lasting one to two years resulting from wind turbine construction. Many jobs would be in rural Kansas, where opportunities to create new jobs are limited. And many of these jobs are good jobs. A typical wind turbine maintenance job, for example, pays over $20/hour, *Jobs and Economic Development Impact Model, National Renewable Energy Laboratory.*

In addition, expanding wind generation is projected to increase property tax revenues by $19 million annually for Kansas schools and local governments. Kansas landowners are projected to receive additional lease payments of $20.8 million annually.

What is the economic impact of wind energy in Kansas?

Increasing the national wind power capacity to 20% is projected to increase Kansas wind generation capacity to 7,158 megawatts and make Kansas a major wind exporter. Kansas has exceptional wind resources, the third greatest overall potential among the states for wind energy production, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.

The expansion of wind electric generation would generate substantial direct, indirect, and induced economic benefits for Kansas. Direct benefits include jobs, land lease payments, and increased tax revenues. Indirect and induced benefits result from local spending due to increased demand for goods and services. Economic benefit drivers include the use of local construction companies, the presence of in-state component suppliers, local wage structures, local property tax structures, and operation and maintenance expenditures. Economic impacts could be further enhanced through the development of a local wind supply, installation, and maintenance industry within the state.

The following charts show some of the economic impact on Kansas, if the state were to develop 7,158 MW wind energy by 2030. Data for this analysis was compiled by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Direct impacts result from investment in the planning, development, and operation of new wind facilities. Beneficiaries include landowners, construction workers, operation and management staff, turbine manufacturers, and project managers. Indirect impacts reflect payments made to businesses that support the wind facility and include: banks, component suppliers, and manufacturers of equipment used to install and maintain the facility. Induced benefits result from increased spending by the direct and indirect beneficiaries.

Jobs created in Kansas from 7,158 MW of new wind development by 2030
Wind energy's economic "ripple effect"

	Direct Impacts	Indirect and Induced Impacts	Total Impact
New jobs during construction phase (1-2 years)	11,471	11,212	22,683
New jobs during operational phase—long term jobs (20+ years)	1,805	1,288	3,093

Economic Impacts to Kansas from 7,158 MW of new wind development by 2030
Wind energy's economic "ripple effect"

	Direct Impacts	Indirect and Induced Impacts
Payment to Landowners per year	$19 Million	
Local Property Tax Revenue per year	$20.8 Million	
Benefit to local economy (construction phase)	$1.35 Billion	$984 Million
Benefit to local economy (operational phase)	$152 Million/year	$119 Million/year

Kansas

What are some of the benefits of wind energy in Kansas?

If wind energy deployment gradually increases to 20% of the nation's electricity over the same time period, potentially, four trillion gallons of water will be conserved. Kansas and the Midwest/Great Plains would see a water consumption savings of 1.64 trillion gallons nationally. (DOE 20% Wind Energy by 2030).

Where is the best wind potential in Kansas?



The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) reports as of January 1, 2009, Kansas has the installed capacity to produce 921 MWh (megawatt hours). Major areas of good wind resource are found throughout much of western Kansas with scattered areas in the eastern part of the state. Significant areas of excellent wind resource are located in southwestern Kansas and extend to north-central Kansas. Population centers located close to excellent resource areas include Garden City, Great Bend and Dodge City (the nation's windiest city according to the National Climatic Data Center). The best wind resource areas are typically located on elevated terrain features, whereas the lowest wind resource are generally located in valleys and basins with relatively low elevations.

This map indicates that Kansas has significant wind resources consistent with utility-scale production. (The darker the color the greater the potential.) This map can be found at www.windpoweringamerica.gov/images/windmaps/ks_50m_800.jpg

Manufacturing in Kansas

A second report, *Component Manufacturing: Kansas' Future in the Renewable Energy Industry*. by the Renewable Energy Policy Project 2008, focuses solely on manufacturing jobs for various types of renewable energy. The report identifies the counties in Kansas with the greatest potential for creating new manufacturing jobs from development of wind. This is an estimate of potential job creation in manufacturing, rather than a projection.

It should be noted that though manufacturing jobs are less likely than direct construction jobs to be located in the primarily rural areas in which turbines would be constructed, the report still shows that nearly 60% of the potential manufacturing jobs are in rural Kansas.

County * non-rural county		County * non-rural county	
Saline		Crawford	
Johnson*		Reno	
Sedgwick*		Ford	
Ellis		Neosho	
Wyandotte*		Franklin	
Barton		Cowley	
Montgomery		McPherson	
Crawford		Republic	
Reno		Butler	
Ford		Anderson	

For more information, please contact John Crabtree, Center for Rural Affairs, johnc@cfra.org or 402-687-2103, ext. 1010

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About the Center for Rural Affairs

The Center for Rural Affairs was established in 1973 as a 501(c)3 nonprofit by rural Nebraskans and has since grown to a nationally recognized policy analysis and advocacy organization focused on the upper Midwest and Great Plains. In recent years our national grassroots base has grown to nearly **30,000 individuals including people in all 50 states.** Our mission is to establish strong rural communities, social and economic justice, environmental stewardship, and genuine opportunity for all while engaging people in decisions that affect the quality of their lives and the future of their communities. Our work includes:

- Advocating for federal policies supporting rural community development that reduces poverty, rewards resource stewardship, and strengthens small farms and businesses. In the recent farm bill, the Center won funding for a new microenteprise program to serve low and moderate income rural communities.
- Providing loans, technical assistance and training to small entrepreneurs through our Rural Enterprise Assistance Program (REAP), the nation's leading statewide rural microenterprise development program.
- Providing comprehensive rural community development services.
- Developing new cooperatives to reach and expand premium markets that reward sustainable agriculture, strengthen family farms, and open the doors of opportunity to beginning farmers.

The Center for Rural Affairs has a long and proven track record in promoting sustainable agriculture policy and practices. In 1976 our Small Farm Energy Project pioneered on-farm sustainable agriculture research, now the preferred research method for sustainable agriculture. In 1979 we published a research report on the growth of large-scale hog factories, the public policies that favor them, and the threat they pose to family farms. That report, titled "Who Will Sit Up With the Corporate Sow?," laid the foundation for the Center's continuing effort to keep hog production on sustainable family farms. In 1982, the Center played a pivotal role in a coalition of farm and religious groups to secure the passage of "Initiative 300" by a vote of Nebraskans to restrict corporate farming and to protect family farms in the state.

In 1986, the Center for Rural Affairs initiated its work on federal conservation policy with an analysis of implementation of the Conservation Reserve Program. Two years later, the Center played a leading role in the formation of the Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, now the leading voice for sustainable agriculture policy in Washington, D.C. In the early 1990s, we were the lead founder of the National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture. Our historic efforts in creating these organizations were pivotal in establishing a voice for grassroots conservation and sustainable agriculture advocates in federal policy debates.

Over the last two decades, the Center has demonstrated its effectiveness by winning significant reforms in state and federal agricultural and rural development policy. The Center is also viewed by the media as a knowledgeable source and credible voice of rural people. In recent years, the Center has been quoted in many nationwide Associated Press stories, the primary national news source for the rural media. Our work is covered in the New York Times, the Economist, CNN, Christian Science Monitor, San Francisco Chronicle, Reuters, National Public Radio, PBS, the Los Angeles Times, the Clear Channel Network, and many prominent regional news media.

The Center for Rural Affairs has evolved into one of the nation's leading rural organizations known for our pioneering work to rebuild rural America and our national work to reform federal policy.

Our Values

Our work is guided by a dedicated board of directors and our values. We value:

- **Responsibility** –to contribute to the betterment of our community and society;
- **Conscience** that balances self-interest with an obligation to the common good;
- **Progress** that strengthens rural communities, small businesses and family farms;
- **Genuine opportunity** for all to earn a living, raise a family and prosper in a rural place;
- **Stewardship** of the environment on which current and future generations rely;
- **Widespread ownership** and control of small businesses, farms and ranches by those who work them;
- **Fairness** that allows all who contribute to the nation's prosperity to share in it: and
- **Citizen involvement** and action to shape the future.

Recent Articles

Rural Monitor:

- Rural Youth: Who's Staying, Who's Leaving?
- Nearly $1.5M to aid rural Nebraska businesses
- Entrepreneurial pioneers revive Lewellen's Main Street
- 'Bring Your Own Restaurant' Hot in Holyoke
- Dartmouth project takes science to rural libraries

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



Featured Ally

MONTANA FARMERS UNION

Montana Farmers Union is an ally in our work to advocate for a health care system that meets the challenges of rural communities, small businesses and family farmers and ranchers. They engage their farmer and rancher members in critical policy debates important to the future of rural America. Visit them online today.

Video Wall

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We reflect these values in our projects as well as in the way we treat each other within the organization. We provide our staff the extraordinary opportunity to devote their professional lives to working for the things they believe in – in common purpose with people of like mind.

Center Leadership

Paul Swanson, President and Board Chair
Chuck Hassebrook, Executive Director and Rural Policy Program Director
Jon Bailey, Rural Research and Analysis Program Director
Jeff Reynolds, Rural Enterprise Assistance Project (REAP) Program Director
Kathie Starkweather, Rural Opportunities and Stewardship Program Director
Brian Depew, Rural Organizing and Outreach Program Director
Barbara Chamness, Administrative and Organizational Development Director

Plus 25 program and administrative staff in offices in Lyons and Hartington, Nebraska and REAP field service staff in home offices in Atkinson, Minden, Morrill, Plymouth, Seward, South Sioux City, and Tecumseh, Nebraska.

Center Financial Support

The Center for Rural Affairs receives its support through grants and contracts, donations, honoraria, fees for services, and publications income. Total 2007 budget: $2.5 million.

Call or write to receive our free monthly newsletter, publications list, annual report, or for more information about specific programs and projects listed above.

»

Rural Policy Organizer Steph Larsen speaking after a meeting on health care.

Grocery store brings hope for a better tomorrow.

On the Blogs

The Rural Blog
Health insurance killing rural America, farmers say

New America Blogs
Russian Roulette in Rural America

Open Left
Healthcare Crisis Stifling Rural Independence

Change.org
7 Years, 428 Percent Profits

The White House Blog
on Rural Health Care

McClusky, North Dakota Blog
A Valuable Organization

The Rural Blog
Center identifies top 10 rural health concerns

The Non-Consumer Advocate
An Evening Out for Rural Issues

The Rural Blog
Out of reach of TV stations' new signals, rural Americans

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Center on the Web

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SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

Permanent Address: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=wind-farm-radar-clutter

Wind Turbine or Airplane? New Radar Could Cut Through the Signal Clutter

The push for wind as a renewable energy source has turbines sharing the same airspace as aircraft, with aging radar systems unable to tell the difference

By Larry Greenemeier Friday, September 3, 2010 5

Wind turbines function best in wide-open spaces where they can capture airflow unobstructed by buildings or mountains. Unfortunately, these same conditions are also optimal for aircraft takeoffs and landings, creating tension between wind energy utilities and airports in a number of locations worldwide. Utility-scale wind turbines, many of which stand more than 100 meters tall, can interfere with the radar used to safely guide aircraft.

Radar works by emitting radio waves in a particular direction and gathering data about waves reflected back to the radar's position that can be used to identify the range, altitude, direction and speed of nearby objects. Wind turbines can defeat radar either by blocking signals or by creating unwanted reflections of the signals, resulting in clutter on radar maps.

Aging radar technology and the demand for renewable sources of energy have complicated the situation, slowing and in some cases stopping the construction of new wind farms. The British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) estimates that 6 gigawatts of planned new wind capacity are being held back by objections over radar. (Britain's overall installed wind-power capacity as of the end of 2009 was 4.1 gigawatts.)

In the U.S., new wind farms are threatening to interfere with surveillance radars used by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the U.S. Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security, said Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dorothy Robyn in June at a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee hearing on the impact of wind turbines on military readiness (pdf). Long-range radars managed by NORAD and Northern Command to maintain airspace surveillance and air defense are decades old, and many still use analog signal processors, which are inherently less effective at removing wind turbine clutter, according to Robyn.

Concerns over the impact of wind farms and aircraft radar must be resolved if the U.S. Department of Energy is to reach its goal of using wind energy to provide 20 percent or more of the nation's electricity (pdf), according to the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), a trade association representing business in the wind-energy industry.

One approach to the problem is upgrading radar systems, which have been used to track ships and aircraft since before World War II, with advanced digital signal processors so they can manage larger amounts of data and thereby identify and filter out the signal scrambling caused by wind turbines.

Typically a radar system will send and receive a single beam of radio waves—either high or low radio frequency—that can be deciphered with a minimal amount of computer processing power. Concerned that wind farms would create disturbances that prevent conventional radar systems from distinguishing between signal clutter and aircraft in need of assistance, Britain's National Air Traffic Services (NATS) began working with Raytheon Company in 2006 to upgrade systems with advanced digital signal processors and data-processing software. The upgraded systems were designed to handle both high and low radio frequency beams concurrently, providing a wealth of data to better map signal clutter and distinguish between the Doppler signals (indicating movement) created by turbines and by aircraft.

In July and August, Raytheon and NATS worked with the Royal Netherlands Air Force to test an enhanced radar system at that

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country's Soesterberg Air Base and determine whether the system was effective at keeping the nearby wind turbines from cluttering air traffic control displays with false targets and obfuscating real aircraft. Once the results of these tests are analyzed, NATS plans to further test the new radar system at a civilian airport with nearby turbines in northern Scotland later this year.

Whereas Raytheon advocates the upgrade of radar systems, others propose ways to make the wind turbines themselves less visible to radar. Denmark's Vestas Wind Systems, which makes wind turbines with blades as long as the wings of a Boeing 747, is working with QinetiQ Group (formerly part of the U.K.'s Defense Evaluation and Research Agency) to develop radar-absorbing coatings and composite materials containing conductive particles like iron and carbon for Vestas's turbines and towers. Vestas began testing prototype "stealth" blades about a year ago and plans to begin selling them next year. Although the company acknowledges that it cannot make its turbines invisible to radar, these radar-absorbing efforts could have an impact on whether companies get a green light from the government to build wind turbine fields.

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NCSL Capitol Security Survey (2009-2010)

1. Please list your state

	Response Total	Response Percent
Alabama	2	3%
Alaska	1	2%
Arizona	0	0%
Arkansas	1	2%
California	1	2%
Colorado	3	5%
Connecticut	0	0%
Delaware	1	2%
Florida	1	2%
Georgia	1	2%
Hawaii	1	2%
Idaho	1	2%
Illinois	0	0%
Indiana	1	2%
Iowa	1	2%
Kansas	1	2%
Kentucky	1	2%
Louisiana	1	2%
Maine	1	2%
Maryland	1	2%
Massachusetts	1	2%
Michigan	1	2%
Minnesota	2	3%
Mississippi	1	2%
Missouri	2	3%
Montana	2	3%
Nebraska	6	10%
Nevada	1	2%
New Hampshire	3	5%
New Jersey	1	2%
New Mexico	1	2%
New York	0	0%
North Carolina	1	2%
North Dakota	1	2%
Ohio	1	2%
Oklahoma	1	2%
Oregon	1	2%
Pennsylvania	1	2%
Rhode Island	1	2%
South Carolina	1	2%
South Dakota	1	2%
Tennessee	1	2%
Texas	1	2%
Utah	1	2%
Vermont	1	2%

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November 22, 2010
Attachment 6-1

Virginia	1	2%
Washington	1	2%
West Virginia	1	2%
Wisconsin	1	2%
Wyoming	1	2%
Total Respondents	**59**	

2. Landscaping features are often used to prevent a vehicle from getting too close to the capitol. What types of these features do you have around the perimeter of the capitol building for this purpose?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Bollards	24	62%
Planters	22	56%
Walls	10	26%
Swales	0	0%
Ponds	1	3%
Fountains	1	3%
Concrete Benches	8	21%
Large Trees	12	31%
Light posts	7	18%
Other, please specify View	9	23%
Total Respondents	**39**	
(skipped this question)	20	

3. How many entrances of the Capitol are open to the public?

	Response Total	Response Percent
One	5	10%
Two	14	28%
Three	5	10%
Four	10	20%
Five	5	10%
Six	2	4%
More Than Six	9	18%
Total Respondents	**50**	
(skipped this question)	9	

4. Are security guards present at those entrances?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	26	52%
No	24	48%
Total Respondents	**50**	
(skipped this question)	9	

5. Are the security guards armed at those entrances?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	17	65%
No	7	27%
Additional Comments (optional) view	2	8%
Total Respondents	26	
(skipped this question)	33	

6. What type of security equipment is being used in those entrances?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Walk Through Metal Detectors	19	68%
Hand Held Metal Detectors	14	50%
X-Ray Machines	13	46%
Hand Searches	9	32%
Additional Comments (optional) view	11	39%
Total Respondents	28	
(skipped this question)	31	

7. Who is required to pass through detectors, receive hand searches, or run personal items through x-ray machines?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Governor	1	4%
Governor's Staff	2	8%
Legislators	1	4%
Legislative Staff	3	12%
Constitutional Officers	3	12%
Staff	3	12%
Other Capitol Occupants	4	16%
Custodial Staff	3	12%
Media	14	56%
Lobbyists	16	64%
General Public	20	80%
School Groups	18	72%
Orchestras/Bands	15	60%
Other, please specify view	7	28%
Total Respondents	25	
(skipped this question)	34	

8. Are ID badges required in the building?

	Response Total	Response Percent

Yes		24	45%
No		24	45%
Additional Comments view		5	9%
		Total Respondents	53
		(skipped this question)	6

9. Who is required to wear the badges?

		Response Total	Response Percent
Legislators		13	57%
Legislative Staff		21	91%
Governor's Staff		19	83%
Custodial Staff		20	87%
Lobbyists		15	65%
Media		16	70%
Other, please specify view		8	35%
		Total Respondents	23
		(skipped this question)	36

10. Are packages and mail x-rayed prior to delivery in the capitol?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	0	0%
No	0	0%
	Total Respondents	0
	(skipped this question)	59

11. How are packages and mail handled in your capitol?

	Response Total	Response Percent
X-rayed prior to delivery (remote location)	0	0%
Scanned for explosives whenever they appear questionable (remote location)	0	0%
X-rayed prior to delivery (onsite)	0	0%
Scanned for explosives whenever they appear questionable (onsite)	0	0%
	Total Respondents	0
	(skipped this question)	59

12. Who is allowed to carry weapons into the capitol building?

		Response Total	Response Percent
Capitol Police or State Police tasked with securing the building		43	91%

Sergeant at Arms	8	17%
Commissioned Police Officers on official business	36	77%
Commissioned Peace Officers not on official business	20	43%
Governor's Security Detail	38	81%
Private Citizens With Concealed Weapons Permit	10	21%
Everyone	3	6%
Other, please specify view	2	4%
Total Respondents		47
(skipped this question)		12

13. Does your Senate Chamber have Commissioned Peace Officers providing security?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	25	52%
No	23	48%
Total Respondents		48
(skipped this question)		11

14. Does your House Chamber have Commissioned Peace Officers providing security?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	22	49%
No	23	51%
Total Respondents		45
(skipped this question)		14

15. Do you have a specific plan in place to increase security under certain circumstances?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Yes	38	84%
No	7	16%
Total Respondents		45
(skipped this question)		14

16. What circumstances would require an increased level of security?

View responses to this question	view
Total Respondents	32
(skipped this question)	27

17. What types of monitoring equipment is being used inside and outside the capitol?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Exterior Closed Circuit TV	40	91%
Interior Closed Circuit TV	39	89%
Intercom Services	17	39%
Motion Sensors	11	25%
Other, please specify view	9	20%
Total Respondents	44	
(skipped this question)	15	

18. What entity oversees general security at the state capitol?

	Response Total	Response Percent
Capitol Police	16	38%
State Police	12	29%
Capitol Security	4	10%
Sergeant at Arms	3	7%
Additional Comments (optional) view	7	17%
Total Respondents	42	
(skipped this question)	17	

19. Please submit your name and email so that we can send you the final survey results (optional).

	Response Total	Response Percent
view Name	44	75%
view Email	44	75%
Total Respondents	44	
(skipped this question)	15	

Capitol Security Survey: Who is allowed to carry Weapons into the Capitol Building?

State	Capitol Security charged with securing the building	Sergeant at Arms	Commissioned Peace officers on official Business	Commissioned Peace Officers not on official business	Governor's Security Detail	Private Citizens with Concealed Weapons Permit	Everyone	Other
Alabama								
Alaska	X		X	X	X	X		
Arizona								
Arkansas	X		X		X			
California	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Colorado	X		X	X	X			
Connecticut								
Delaware	X		X		X			
Florida	X		X	X	X			
Georgia	X		X		X			
Hawaii	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Idaho	X		X		X			
Illinois								
Indiana	X		X	X	X			
Iowa	X							
Kansas	X		X	X	X			
Kentucky							X	
Louisiana	X	X			X			
Maine	X		X					
Maryland	X		X		X			
Massachusetts								
Michigan	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Minnesota	X		X		X	X		
Mississippi	X		X	X	X			
Missouri	X		X		X			
Montana			X					
Nebraska	X		X	X	X			
Nevada	X		X		X			
New Hampshire			X	X				
New Jersey	X		X	X	X			
New Mexico	X		X	X	X			
New York								
North Carolina	X		X		X			
North Dakota	X				X			
Ohio	X	X	X		X			
Oklahoma	X		X		X			
Oregon								
Pennsylvania	X	X	X		X			
Rhode Island								

State	Capitol Security charged with securing the bullding	Sergeant at Arms	Commissioned Peace officers on official Business	Commissioned Peace Officers not on official business	Governor's Security Detail	Private Citizens with Concealed Weapons Permit	Everyone	Other
South Carolina	X	X	X		X			
South Dakota	X							
Tennessee	X		X	X	X			
Texas							X	
Utah								
Vermont	X		X		X			
Virginia	X		X	X	X	X		
Washington	X		X	X	X	X		
West Virginia	X							
Wisconsin	X		X	X	X			
Wyoming	X				X			

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Note: The following chambers did not respond to the portion of the survey: AL, AZ, CT, IL, KS, KY, MA, NH, NY, OR, RI, UT

Capitol Security: Are ID Badges Required in the Capitol? Who is Required to Wear Them?

State	Yes	No	State	Legislators	Legislative Staff	Governor's Staff	Custodial Staff	Lobbyists	Media	Other
Alabama	X		Alabama					X		
Alaska		X	Alaska							
Arizona			Arizona							
Arkansas	X		Arkansas		X	X	X	X	X	
California	X		California		X	X	X		X	
Colorado	X		Colorado	X	X	X	X			X
Connecticut	X		Connecticut		X			X		
Delaware	X		Delaware	X	X	X		X	X	
Florida		X	Florida							
Georgia	X		Georgia	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Hawaii	X		Hawaii		X					
Idaho		X	Idaho							
Illinois	X		Illinois					X	X	
Indiana	X		Indiana	X	X	X	X			
Iowa	X		Iowa	X	X	X	X			
Kansas	X		Kansas	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kentucky	X		Kentucky	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Louisiana	X		Louisiana		X	X		X	X	
Maine		X	Maine							
Maryland	X		Maryland	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Massachusetts		X	Massachusetts							
Michigan		X	Michigan							
Minnesota	X		Minnesota							
Mississippi	X		Mississippi							
Missouri	X		Missouri	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Montana	X		Montana							X
Nebraska		X	Nebraska							
Nevada	X		Nevada		X		X	X	X	X
New Hampshire		X	New Hampshire							
New Jersey	X		New Jersey		X	X	X	X	X	
New Mexico		X	New Mexico							
New York			New York							
North Carolina		X	North Carolina							
North Dakota		X	North Dakota							
Ohio	X		Ohio	X	X	X	X			
Oklahoma	X		Oklahoma		X	X	X			
Oregon		X	Oregon							
Pennsylvania	X		Pennsylvania	X	X	X	X		X	
Rhode Island			Rhode Island							

State	Yes	No	State	Legislators	Legislative Staff	Governor's Staff	Custodial Staff	Lobbyists	Media	Other
South Carolina		X	South Carolina							
South Dakota		X	South Dakota							
Tennessee	X		Tennessee	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Texas		X	Texas							
Utah			Utah							
Vermont		X	Vermont							
Virginia	X		Virginia				X	X	X	X
Washington	X		Washington		X		X			
West Virginia		X	West Virginia							
Wisconsin	X		Wisconsin	X	X	X			X	X
Wyoming		X	Wyoming							

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Note:

1. The following states did not respond to this portion of the survey: AZ, CT, IL, MN, NY, RI, UT
2. NA: means that no answer was submitted for that specific question.

Capitol Security Survey: Who is allowed to carry Weapons into the Capitol Building?

State	Capitol Security charged with securing the building	Sergeant at Arms	Commissioned Peace officers on official Business	Commissioned Peace Officers not on official business	Governor's Security Detail	Private Citizens with Concealed Weapons Permit	Everyone	Other
Alabama								
Alaska	X		X	X	X	X		
Arizona								
Arkansas	X		X		X			
California	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Colorado	X		X	X	X			
Connecticut								
Delaware	X		X		X			
Florida	X		X	X	X			
Georgia	X		X		X			
Hawaii	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Idaho	X		X		X			
Illinois								
Indiana	X		X	X	X			
Iowa	X							
Kansas	X		X	X	X			
Kentucky							X	
Louisiana	X	X			X			
Maine	X		X					
Maryland	X		X		X			
Massachusetts								
Michigan	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Minnesota	X		X		X	X		
Mississippi	X		X	X	X			
Missouri	X		X		X			
Montana			X					
Nebraska	X		X	X	X			
Nevada	X		X		X			
New Hampshire			X	X				
New Jersey	X		X	X	X			
New Mexico	X		X	X	X			
New York								
North Carolina	X		X		X			
North Dakota	X				X			
Ohio	X	X	X		X			
Oklahoma	X		X		X			
Oregon								
Pennsylvania	X	X	X		X			
Rhode Island								

State	Capitol Security charged with securing the building	Sergeant at Arms	Commissioned Peace officers on official Business	Commissioned Peace Officers not on official business	Governor's Security Detail	Private Citizens with Concealed Weapons Permit	Everyone	Other
South Carolina	X	X	X		X			
South Dakota	X							
Tennessee	X		X	X	X			
Texas							X	
Utah								
Vermont	X		X		X			
Virginia	X		X	X	X	X		
Washington	X		X	X	X	X		
West Virginia	X							
Wisconsin	X		X	X	X			
Wyoming	X				X			

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Note: The following chambers did not respond to the portion of the survey: AL, AZ, CT, IL, KS, KY, MA, NH, NY, OR, RI, UT

Capitol Security: Perimeter and Landscaping Security Features.

State	Bollards	Planters	Walls	Swales	Ponds	Fountains	Concrete Benches	Large Trees	Light Posts	Other
Alabama	X	X	X							
Alaska		X	X							
Arizona										
Arkansas	X		X							
California	X	X	X				X	X	X	
Colorado	X	X					X		X	X
Connecticut										
Delaware										
Florida	X	X						X		
Georgia			X					X		
Hawaii		X			X					
Idaho										
Illinois		X				X	X	X	X	
Indiana		X	X				X			
Iowa								X		
Kansas							X	X	X	
Kentucky		X								
Louisiana										
Maine	X	X	X							
Maryland		X								
Massachusetts										
Michigan										
Minnesota										
Mississippi										X
Missouri	X						X			
Montana										
Nebraska										
Nevada	X	X					X	X	X	
New Hampshire			X				X			
New Jersey	X									
New Mexico		X	X							X
New York										
North Carolina	X	X								
North Dakota										
Ohio	X	X								
Oklahoma	X	X						X		
Oregon										X
Pennsylvania	X	X	X			X		X	X	
Rhode Island										

Capitol Security: Perimeter and Landscaping Security Features.

State	Bollards	Planters	Walls	Swales	Ponds	Fountains	Concrete Benches	Large Trees	Light Posts	Other
South Carolina	X	X	X					X		
South Dakota	X									
Tennessee	X	X					X	X		
Texas	X	X								
Utah		X	X							X
Vermont									X	X
Virginia										X
Washington	X	X								
West Virginia	X							X	X	
Wisconsin										
Wyoming	X							X		

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Note: The following states did not respond to this portion of the survey: DE, ID, LA, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NH, RI, WI.

What Entity Overseas General Security at the State Capitol?

State	Capitol Police	State Police	Capitol Security	Sergeant at Arms	Additional Comments
Alabama	X				
Alaska	X				
Arizona					
Arkansas	X				
California				X	
Colorado		X			
Connecticut					
Delaware	X				
Florida					
Georgia	x				
Hawaii					Capitol Sheriffs under the Department of Public Safety oversees general security. The House and Senate Sergeant At Arms oversee areas controlled by respective bodies.
Idaho					Department of Administration
Illinois					Secretary of State Police maintains state capitol police, which provide law enforcement and protection
Indiana		X			
Iowa	X				
Kansas					
Kentucky		X			
Louisiana				X	
Maine		X			
Maryland	X	X			Both the State Police and "capitol" police provide security in the legislative complex. During the interim months the "capitol" police are the primary security but there is still a SP presence. During session State Police provide security in committees and in the chambers and generally on grounds but capitol police secure the buildings year round.
Massachusetts					
Michigan			X		
Minnesota					

Mississippi	X				
Missouri	X				
Montana					Capitol Sheriffs under the Department of Public Safety oversees general security. The House and Senate Sergeant At Arms oversee areas controlled by respective bodies.
Nebraska		X			
Nevada					Nevada 1. Capitol Police responsible for Capitol 2. Legislative Police responsible for Legislature.
New Hampshire			X		
New Jersey		X			
New Mexico			X		
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota			X		
Ohio		X			
Oklahoma				X	
Oregon		X			
Pennsylvania	X				
Rhode Island					
South Carolina	X				
South Dakota		X			
Tennessee		X			
Texas		X			
Utah		X			
Vermont	X				
Virginia					
Washington		X			
West Virginia	X				
Wisconsin	X				
Wyoming					State Highway Patrol

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
Note: The following states did not respond to this portion of the survey: AZ, CT, FL, KS, MA, MN, NH, NY, NC, RI, VA.

Capitol Security:
Do you have a Commissioned Peace Officer Providing Security in your Chamber?

State	Senate	House
Alabama	Yes	Yes
Alaska	Yes	Yes
Arizona		
Arkansas	Yes	Yes
California	Yes	Yes
Colorado	No	No
Connecticut	Yes	Yes
Delaware	No	No
Florida	Yes	Yes
Georgia	No	No
Hawaii	No	No
Idaho	No	No
Illinois		
Indiana	Yes	Yes
Iowa	No	No
Kansas	Yes	Yes
Kentucky	Yes	Yes
Louisiana	Yes	Yes
Maine	No	No
Maryland	Yes	Yes
Massachusetts		
Michigan	Yes	Yes
Minnesota	No	No
Mississippi	Yes	Yes
Missouri	No	No
Montana	No	No
Nebraska	Yes	NA
Nevada	Yes	Yes
New Hampshire	No	No
New Jersey	Yes	Yes
New Mexico	No	No
New York		
North Carolina	No	No
North Dakota	Yes	Yes
Ohio	No	Yes
Oklahoma	No	No
Oregon	Yes	Yes
Pennsylvania	No	No
Rhode Island	NA	NA
South Carolina	Yes	Yes
South Dakota	No	No
Tennessee	Yes	Yes
Texas	Yes	Yes
Utah	Yes	Yes

State	Senate	House
Vermont	No	No
Virginia	Yes	Yes
Washington	Yes	No
West Virginia	No	No
Wisconsin	No	No
Wyoming	No	No

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Note: The following states did not respond to this portion of the survey: AZ, CT, IL, MA, NY, RI.

Capitol Security: Monitoring Equipment Inside/Outside the Capitol Building

State	Exterior Closed Circuit TV	Interior Closed Circuit TV	Intercom Services	Motion Sensors	Other
Alabama					
Alaska	X	X	X		
Arizona					
Arkansas	X	X	X	X	
California	X	X	X	X	X
Colorado	X	X	X		X
Connecticut					
Delaware	X	X			
Florida	X	X	X		
Georgia	X				
Hawaii	X	X			
Idaho	X	X	X		
Illinois					
Indiana		X			
Iowa	X	X			X
Kansas	X	X		X	
Kentucky	X	X			
Louisiana	X	X			
Maine	X	X			
Maryland	X	X			
Massachusetts					
Michigan	X	X			
Minnesota	X	X	X	X	
Mississippi	X				X
Missouri	X	X		X	
Montana	X	X			X
Nebraska	X	X	X		
Nevada	X	X	X		
New Hampshire	X	X			
New Jersey		X		X	
New Mexico	X	X			
New York					
North Carolina	X	X			
North Dakota	X	X			
Ohio	X	X	X		
Oklahoma	X	X		X	
Oregon	X	X	X		
Pennsylvania	X	X	X	X	
Rhode Island					

Capitol Security: Monitoring Equipment Inside/Outside the Capitol Building

State	Exterior Closed Circuit TV	Interior Closed Circuit TV	Intercom Services	Motion Sensors	Other
South Carolina	X	X	X		
South Dakota	X				
Tennessee	X	X			
Texas	X	X	X		
Utah	X	X	X	X	
Vermont					X
Virginia	X	X		X	
Washington					
West Virginia	X	X			X
Wisconsin	X	X	X		
Wyoming					X

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Note: The following state did not respond to this portion of the survey: AL, AZ, CT, IL, MA, NH, NY, RI, WA.

Capitol Security: Do you have a specific plan to increase security under certain circumstances?

State	Yes	No	State	What circumstances would require an increased level of security?
Alabama	X		Alabama	Threats to individuals or the capitol itself and high profile events, such as the State of the State Address or a large reception.
Alaska	X		Alaska	When we have our United States Senators or Congressman speak, also the Chief Justice. We hire or have the State Troopers come to the House Chambers.
Arizona			Arizona	
Arkansas	X		Arkansas	Legislative sessions, direct known threats, large events, visiting dignitaries.
California	X		California	Outside Demonstrations that become violent. Rising of the National Security level. A major Security incident happens in the bldg or capitol park (e.g. The President Ford assassination attempt) Major visit such as the President, or major event such as an inaugural. National Security event, an incident in the City of Sacramento, etc.
Colorado	X		Colorado	A rise in the national threat level and incident in the Capitol or some special events like the State of the State.
Connecticut	X		Connecticut	
Delaware	X		Delaware	Large crowds attending a debate or public hearing. Demonstrations outside our building. Any controversial piece of legislation being considered when one might expect the public to voice their approval or disapproval.
Florida	X		Florida	
Georgia	X		Georgia	National threat level raised by Homeland Security or known local threats. Also Special Events that draw large crowds and/or protests, VIP visits and other incidents of significance.
Hawaii	X		Hawaii	
Idaho	X		Idaho	Anticipated crowds or demonstrations.
Illinois			Illinois	
Indiana	X		Indiana	

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Iowa	X		Iowa	Governor's Address to the General Assembly, potentially contentious public hearing, rallies in the Capitol rotunda
Kansas	X		Kansas	High profile events and any raise in the National Threat Level.
Kentucky	X		Kentucky	Any threat that is received or any known threat. Increased level of security is in place for any type of hearing or rally that involves emotional issues such as abortion, death penalty, or marital status.
Louisiana	X		Louisiana	National and Local threat levels, certain protest or demonstrations.
Maine		X	Maine	
Maryland			Maryland	
Massachusetts			Massachusetts	
Michigan	X		Michigan	Credible or known threat to the building or occupants, evacuations due to catastrophic event, special events such as demonstrations, festivals, receptions, state of the state joint sessions, etc.
Minnesota		X	Minnesota	
Mississippi		X	Mississippi	
Missouri			Missouri	
Montana		X	Montana	
Nebraska	X		Nebraska	Security is increased during a legislative session or when many committee meetings occur simultaneously during the interim.
Nevada			Nevada	Increased Threat level, Legislative Session, Special activities
New Hampshire	X		New Hampshire	Increased threat level, extra State Police Officers are called in.
New Jersey	X		New Jersey	Specific threats, special details (State of the State address, etc.), National or State elevation of Security Threat Advisory System
New Mexico	X		New Mexico	During session and if there is a high profile bill on the chamber floor.
New York			New York	
North Carolina	X		North Carolina	activation of the emergency notification system
North Dakota	X		North Dakota	ANY KNOWN THREAT - (local or national threat), REQUEST FOR EXTRA SECURITY, SPECIAL HEARINGS ON CERTAIN CONTROVERSIAL BILLS, ETC.
Ohio	X		Ohio	Various circumstances would warrant an increase.
Oklahoma	X		Oklahoma	Any breach of security or any

				incident deemed by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol
Oregon	X		Oregon	Security is increased during a legislative session or when many committee meetings occur simultaneously during the interim.
Pennsylvania	X		Pennsylvania	
Rhode Island			Rhode Island	
South Carolina		X	South Carolina	
South Dakota		X	South Dakota	
Tennessee	X		Tennessee	
Texas			Texas	
Utah	X		Utah	Events such as the State of the State address, dignitaries visiting the Capitol, free speech events with large crowds and other such events.
Vermont	X		Vermont	Governors' State of the State and Budget address, Hot topic public hearings, Judicial retention hearings, protests.
Virginia	X		Virginia	Increased threat level, intelligence indicating threat, criminal investigation indicating increased threat, rallies.
Washington	X		Washington	Large demonstrations or intelligence from law enforcement about specific risks.
West Virginia	X		West Virginia	
Wisconsin	X		Wisconsin	Instances where there may be a weapon present or some concern about the physical safety of those in the building.
Wyoming	X		Wyoming	Up graded security level due to threat or incident.

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.
Note: The following states did not respond to this portion of the survey: AZ, CT, IL, MD, MO, NH, NY, RI, TX